RECENT  NEGOTIATIONS 

BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  GREAT  BRITAIN 
REGARDING  A TRANS-ISTHMIAN  CANAL 


BY 

CLAUD  KENNETH  TURMAN 

A.  B.  University  of  Indiana,  1920 


THESIS 

SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILLMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS 
FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  MASTER  OF  ARTS  IN  HISTORY 
IN  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF  THE 
UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS, 

1922 


URBANA,  ILLINOIS 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2015 


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lx)  ihho 



U N I V E R 

THE 


SITY  OF  ILLINOIS 
GRADUATE  SCHOOL 


I HEREBY  RECOMMEND  THAT  THE  THESIS  PREPARED  UNDER  MY 
SUPERVISION  BY_ 


ENTITLED. 


Cl  Aj?  , C/ 


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BE  ACCEPTED  AS  FULFILLING  THIS  PART  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS  FOR 


o_. 


THE  DEGREE  OF 


OF. 

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' * V, ' 

In  Charge  ot  Thesis 

(ft.  UU  $ 

Head  of  Department 

Recommendation  concurred  in* 


Committee 

on 

Final  Examination* 


^0(34 


Required  for  doctor’s  degree  but  not  for  master’s 


■ r ! , l:  • » ‘ , 


TABLE  OP  CONTENTS 


Page 

Chapter  I.  The  Clayton-Bulwer 

Treaty  1 

Chapter  II.  Between  the  Treaties  . . 21 

Chapter  III.  The  First  Hay-Pauneefo te 

Treaty 32 

Chapter  IV.  The  Second  and  Final 

Hay-Paunc efo te  Treaty.  52 
Chapter  V.  The  Tolls  Controversy.  . 63 

Conclusion 85 

Bibliography  87 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  CLAYTON -BULWER  TREATY 

During  the  past  seventy-five  years  the  various  difficul- 
ties that  at  intervals  seriously  threatened  the  good  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  have  been  settled 
amicably  and  honorably  alike  to  both  nations.  One  of  these  dif- 
ferences, however,  has  not  yet  been  permanently  adjusted.  That  is 
the  limitation  by  Great  Britain  of  the  freedom  of  action  of  the 
United  States  in  the  construction,  operation,  maintenance,  and 
regulation  of  any  trans -isthmian  canal.  Where,  then,  did  Great 
Britain  get  the  right  to  restrict  and  to  minimize  the  control  of 
the  United  States  over  such  a canal?  The  answer  is  found  in  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  of  1850,  the  millstone  about  the  neck  of  the 
United  States  in  its  control  of  a canal.  To  get  a proper  under- 
standing of  this,  it  is  obvious  that  one  should  take  a brief  look 
into  the  history  of  the  canal  neighborhood:  the  Bay  Islands,  Belize 
or  British  Honduras,  and  the  Mosquito  Shore. 

Soon  after  Columbus  discovered  the  Bay  Islands  in  1502, 

the  Spanish  made  small  settlements,  but  due  to  the  lack  of  precious 

1 

metals,  they  soon  abandoned  the  islands  for  richer  lands.  The 

location  was  suitable  to  the  freebooters  of  the  seventeenth  and 

early  eighteenth  centuries,  and  the  islands  served  as  a base  of 

2 

operations  against  Spanish  commerce.  In  1742  the  British  seized 


1 

Bancroft,  History  of  Central  America,  III,  p.  263. 

2 

Travis,  The  History  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  9. 


-2- 


the  islands  during  a war  with  Spain,  They  were  returned  at  the  end 

of  the  war,  and  at  the  time  of  the  creation  of  the  Republic  of 

Central  America  were  under  the  control  of  Spain.  When  the  Republic 

achieved  its  independence,  they  fell  under  the  control  of  the 

province  of  Honduras.  But  the  English  had  not  forgotten  them;  and 

when  some  liberated  slaves  from  the  West  Indies  settled  on  these 

islands  and  refused  to  obey  the  laws  of  Central  America,  the  British 

3 

forces  from  Jamaica  came  to  their  relief.  Thus,  Great  Britain  was 
placed  in  practical,  though  not  legal, control  of  the  islands  by 
1849. 

Belize  has  much  the  same  history  as  the  Bay  Islands.  The 
port  of  Belize  also  served  as  a home  for  the  pirates  of  the  Carib- 
bean. Although  England  apparently  aided  these  men,  they  soon  got 

4 

beyond  control  and  steps  were  taken  by  the  English  to  curb  them. 

As  a result,  the  freebooters  turned  to  logwood  cutting,  and  Belize 

became  the  center  of  a lucrative  trade  in  dyewood.  The  Spanish 

held  only  nominal  control,  and  the  English  wood-cutters  did  about 

5 

as  they  pleased.  By  the  Treaty  of  1786  Spanish  sovereignty  was 
recognized  by  the  British  government;  but  the  settlers  felt  other- 
wise. When  in  1798  by  aid  of  a British  warship  they  had  driven  off 
a Spanish  expedition  sent  to  subdue  them,  the  British  Government 


3 

Bancroft,  Central  America,  III,  320. 

4 

Travis,  Olayton-Bulwer  Treaty.  6. 

5 

Ibid. , 9. 


6 

thereupon  claimed  the  region  by  right  of  conquest.  But  once  more, 
by  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Amiens  in  1802  and  the  alliance 

between  England  and  Spain  in  1809,  Spanish  sovereignty  was  again 

'7 

recognized.  When  the  independence  of  Central  America  was  estab- 
lished, the  feeble  government  instituted  was  unable  to  control  the 
settlers.  It  called  upon  the  United  States  for  aid,  but  the  appeal 
was  ignored.  In  1847  the  port  and  the  surrounding  region  were 

recognized  as  a British  colony  by  the  United  States  in  the  sending 

8 

of  a consul  to  that  place.  Thus,  Great  Britain  had  planted  another 

foothold  on  the  isthmus,  with  the  acquiescence  of  the  United  States. 

9 

Mosquito  Shore  was  also  discovered  by  Columbus  in  1502. 

No  attention  was  paid  to  it  by  the  gold-thirsty  Spaniards,  and  it, 

too,  served  as  an  ideal  home  for  freebooters.  These  kept  on  good 

terms  with  the  decadent  natives,  and  also  kept  in  touch  with  the 

governor  of  Jamaica.  In  time,  the  chief  of  the  Mosquito  Indians 

sent  a request  to  the  governor  and  asked  him  for  British  protection. 

Accordingly,  when  this  half-witted  chief  visited  Jamaica  shortly 

10 

afterwards,  he  was  crowned  "King  of  the  Mosquitos.”  Then  followed 
an  extension  of  his  territory.  The  British  trading  interests  had 


6 

Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  10.  11. 

7 

Ibid.,  12. 

8 

Ibid. , 15;  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presi- 
dents, V,  37. 

9 

Bancroft,  Central  America,  I,  11. 

10 

Travis,  Glayt on-Bulwer  Treaty,  19  ff. 


-4- 


now  reached  the  point  where  some  notice  was  taken  of  them;  conse- 
quently, during  the  war  with  Spain,  George  III  appointed  a superin- 

11 

tendent  of  their  trade.  But  "by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  1763,  Great 

Britain  recognized  Spanish  sovereignty  over  the  region.  In  return, 

12 

Spain  allowed  the  British  settlers  to  remain  there.  As  "before, 

the  settlers  did  as  they  pleased;  and  her  exasperation  at  the  stand 

of  England  in  regard  to  the  settlers  was  one  of  the  factors  that 

caused  Spain  to  declare  war  again  in  1780.  Spain  was  not  able  to 

dislodge  the  British,  who  now  seized  the  region  outright.  After 

attempts  to  settle  the  sovereignty,  the  English  yielded  in  1786. 

Again  Spain  was  unable  to  enforce  her  rule  and  gave  up  the  attempts 
13 

in  1796.  Hence,  by  1830  the  British  were  in  actual  control  of 

the  Mosquito  Shore.  Meantime  the  king  of  the  Mosquitos  had  been 

captured  by  the  British.  Before  he  died  in  1840,  he  signed  a will 

appointing  the  British  superintendent  as  regent  over  Mosquitia  dur- 

14 

ing  the  minority  of  the  heir  to  the  throne.  The  next  year  the 
Nicaraguan  commandant  at  San  Juan  del  Norte  at  the  mouth  of  the  San 
Juan  River  was  ordered  by  the  regent  to  recognize  the  authority  of 
the  king  of  Mosquitia.  He  did  so,  but  under  compulsion.  Nicaragua 
protested  valiantly  and  asked  the  United  States  for  aid,  but  the 


11 

Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  25. 

12 

Ibid.,  26. 

13 

Ibid. , 30. 

14 

Ibid.,  36. 


-5- 

15 

note  was  ignored.  Meeting  with  no  opposition  in  their  policy,  the 

British  announced  in  September,  1847,  its  protectorate  over  Mos- 

quitia.  The  Nicaraguan  government  was  ordered  to  evacuate  San  Juan 

del  Norte.  Again  and  again,  the  distressed  Nicaraguans  asked  the 

16 

United  States  for  aid,  only  to  have  their  appeals  ignored.  The 

British  lost  no  time,  however,  and  acting  in  the  name  of  the  king 

of  Mosquitia,  they  forced  Nicaragua  to  evacuate  the  port;  and  in 

March,  1848,  a British  consul  was  appointed.  Nicaragua  felt  that 

this  act  was  an  invasion  of  her  sovereignty  and  at  once  sent  a 

minister  to  London  to  gain  some  recompense  for  the  loss  of  her 

territory;  and  should  such  a request  he  granted,  she  felt  her  own 

17 

prestige  amongst  her  sister  republics  would  not  be  diminished. 

The  mission,  however,  was  not  successful,  and  the  situation  remained 
unchanged. 

Soon  after  the  seizure  of  San  Juan,  Gosta  Rica  became 

aggressive  and  brought  up  an  old  claim  for  some  territory  south  of 

the  San  Juan  river  that  at  that  time  was  under  the  control  of 
18 

Nicaragua.  The  natural  consequence  of  such  a controversy  in  that 
part  of  the  world  was  war.  Nicaragua  prepared  to  attack  Gosta  Rica, 


15 

House  Executive  Do cument , no.  75,  1st  Session,  31st  Con- 
gress, 43;  Richardson,  Messages,  V,  35. 

16 

House  Ex.  Doc.,  no.  75,  1st  Sess.,  31st  Gong.,  79,  80, 
84;  Richardson,  Messages,  V,  35. 

17 

Travis,  01  ayt on-Bulwer  Treaty,  46;  Williams,  Anglo- 
American  Isthmian  Diplomacy,  73. 

Travis,  01 ayt on-Bulwer  Treaty,  55. 


-6- 

but  at  this  time  Great  Britain  and  not  the  United  States  prevented 
a conflict.  This  was  due  to  the  influence  of  that  aggressive  British 
statesman,  Lord  Palmerston,  the  man  who  dictated  the  foreign  policy 
of  his  government  during  the  middle  decades  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury. In  this  instance,  he  ordered  Nicaragua  to  yield  to  the  claims 
19 

of  Costa  Rica,  and  the  existing  pretext  for  war  was  done  away  with. 

Thus  it  is  seen  that  by  1849  England  was  in  practical 
control  of  the  eastern  coast  of  Central  America  from  Costa  Rica  to 
Belize.  This  predominance  was  attained  by  the  extension  of  protec- 
tion to  her  trading  interests  so  as  to  give  her  at  least  a pretence 
of  a claim  to  some  of  these  regions.  Whatever  may  be  said  of  the 
justice  of  her  claims,  the  fact  is  that  she  was  there.  No  doubt 
England  feared  the  expanding  tendencies  of  the  United  States  and 
was  determined  to  forestall  any  signs  of  expansion  in  Central 

America.  In  preparation  for  any  eventuality,  she  had  seized  the 

20 

key  to  the  passage  to  the  Pacific.  This  is  the  position  that  has 
given  her  a voice  in  the  control  of  any  trans -isthmian  canal--and 
we  shall  see  that  this  same  voice  has  never  become  dumb. 

The  United  States  was  a late  entrant  into  the  scramble 
for  the  control  of  a route  across  the  isthmus.  Her  trading  inter- 
ests were  slow  in  getting  a foothold.  Hence,  it  is  obvious  that  her 
policy  in  the  canal  region  would  not  be  of  such  a selfish  type  as 

19 

Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  55. 

20 

Bancroft  to  Clayton,  Mar.  9,  1849.  House  Ex.  Loo. , no. 
75,  1st  Sess.,  31st  Cong.,  233. 


-7- 


that  of  Great  Britain.  As  early  as  1826,  Henry  Olay,  at  that  time 
Secretary  of  State  under  President  John  Quincy  Adams,  had  wanted  a 

canal  that  was  not  to  be  under  the  exclusive  control  of  any 

21 

particular  nation.  Pursuing  this  same  policy,  Senator  John 

Olayton  of  Delaware  had  introduced  in  1835  a Senate  resolution 

directing  the  President  to  consider  entering  into  negotiations  with 

New  Granada  and  Central  America  for  the  protection  of  such  companies 

as  might  undertake  to  build  a canal  that  was  to  secure  to  all  na- 

22 

tions  free  and  equal  rights  of  navigation.  The  resolution  passed 

unanimously,  and  President  Jackson  gave  it  his  hearty  approval. 

23 

But  the  mission  that  was  sent  to  negotiate  was  unsuccessful. 

Prom  1830  to  1850  American  shipping  had  begun  to  make 

24 

its  influence  felt  in  the  commercial  world,  especially  in  Asia. 

In  the  trade  with  China  the  merchants  of  the  United  States  were  by 

far  the  leading  competitors  of  the  British  traders.  The  first 

official  notice  of  this  interest  was  in  the  message  of  President 

Tyler's  message  in  1842.  He  then  emphasized  the  growing  trade 

with  Asia;  he  pointed  out  that  the  British  government  had  negotiated 

a commercial  treaty  with  China,  and  that  it  was  necessary  for  the 

25 

United  States  to  make  a similar  treaty.  The  United  States  then 
sent  an  envoy  to  Canton  to  negotiate  a treaty,  and  in  1844  a treaty 


21 

Congressional  Record,  2nd  Sess..  63rd  Cong..  8946. 

22 

Congressional  Globe,  2nd  Sess.,  32nd  Cong.,  Aup.,  251. 

23 

Ibid . 

24 

Morison,  The  Maritime  History  of  Massachusetts , chapter 

25 

Richardson,  Messages,  IV,  211-214. 


' 


-8- 


26 

was  signed  at  Whampoa.  American  trade  then  increased  rapidly. 

Thus,  the  United  States  gradually  became  interested  in  a shorter 
transit  to  China  for  the  benefit  of  its  Boston  and  New  York  mer- 
chants, who  were  primarily  concerned  at  this  time. 

President  Polk,  in  1846,  revived  the  question  of  isthmian 
transit,  and  in  that  same  year  a commercial  treaty  was  negotiated 
with  New  Granada.  Among  the  provisions  of  this  treaty  was  one  which 
gave  to  the  United  States  the  right  of  way  for  a railroad  or  a 
canal  across  the  isthmus  in  Panama.  The  transit  was  to  be  free  and 
open  to  the  government  and  the  citizens  of  the  United  States;  and 

in  return,  the  United  States  guaranteed  "perfect  neutrality"  of 
27 

transit.  Polk  was  very  anxious  for  the  ratification  of  this 

treaty,  and  when  he  presented  it  to  the  Senate  for  ratification, 

he  brought  out  the  need  of  quick  action  on  the  part  of  the  United 

States:  in  the  first  place,  he  noted  the  rapid  development  of  trade 

with  the  west  coast  of  America;  in  the  second  place,  he  emphasized 

the  importance  and  value  of  the  transit  to  the  trade  with  Asia  and 

the  Pacific  islands;  and  in  the  third  place,  he  wanted  the  United 

States  to  be  the  first  nation  in  this  isthmian  project,  for  he 

28 

feared  that  Great  Britain  or  Prance  might  step  in  ahead.  The 


26 

Morse,  International  Relations  of  the  Chinese  Empire, 

II,  343. 

27 

Malloy,  Treaties.  Conventions , International  Acts , 
Protocols,  and  Agreements  between  the  United  States  and  Other 
Powers  (1776-1909),  I,  303-314.  Of.  The  Public  Statutes  at  Large 
of  the  U.S.A. , IX,  881-901. 

28 

Richardson,  Messages . IV,  511. 


-9- 

treaty  was  ratified. 

Although  the  United  States  had  sympathised  with  Central 
America  in  its  struggle  against  Spain  and  had  rejoiced  in  its  in- 
dependence, that  feeling  soon  died  out  because  of  the  perpetual 
revolutions,  factions,  and  lack  of  any  stable  government.  In  other 
words,  this  condition  of  sympathy  had  changed  to  one  of  almost 
total  indifference.  The  United  States  was  partially  aware  of 

British  aggression,  but  had  not  felt  disposed  to  intervene  when 

29 

these  states  were  impotent  to  help  even  themselves.  It  was  not 

until  the  United  States  sent  Elijah  Hise  as  charge  d'affaires  in 

June,  1848,  for  the  purpose  of  negotiating  commercial  treaties  with 

Guatemala  and  Salvador  that  events  began  to  shape  themselves 

30 

directly  for  the  unlucky  convention  of  1850. 

The  interest  of  the  United  States  on  the  isthmus,  then, 
had  grown  in  proportion  to  trading  interests.  After  the  conclusion 
of  the  treaty  with  Mexico  in  1848,  gold  was  discovered  in  Califor- 
nia. The  whole  world  became  interested  in  some  method  of  transit. 
There  must  be  a better  access  to  "the  West"  than  across  the  plains, 
deserts,  and  mountains.  The  isthmus  seemed  to  solve  the  problem 
partially.  Steamship  lines  were  established  between  New  York  and 
Chagres,  and  between  Panama  and  San  Francisco.  The  Panama  rail- 
road was  being  built  as  fast  as  possible.  British  companies  and 

29 

Richardson,  Messages.  IV.  511. 

30 

House  fix.  Doc.,  no.  75,  1st  Sess.,  31st  Cong.,  92-95. 


. 


■ 


. 

- 


-10- 

American  companies  were  being  formed  for  the  purpose  of  constructing 

31 

a trans-isthmian  canal.  And  last,  but  by  no  means  least,  the 

32 

United  States  was  developing  a strong  national  consciousness 
and  a tendency  towards  territorial  expansion  that  sooner  or  later 
must  come  into  conflict  with  British  interests  on  the  isthmus. 

The  Polk  administration  had  made  a name  for  itself  that 
was  not  to  be  admired  in  the  eyes  of  the  Whigs,  who  immediately 
upon  coming  into  office  proceeded  to  discountenance  any  aggressive 
foreign  policy.  Strange  though  it  may  seem,  the  Democrats  had  not 
pursued  their  usual  aggressive  policy  toward  Central  America.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  incoming  administration  seemed  to  be  very  much 
alive  to  the  possibilities  of  that  region.  President  Taylor  was 
very  eager  for  the  completion  of  a trans -isthmian  route.  Clayton, 
the  Secretary  of  State,  fully  concurred  with  his  chief.  The 
policy  of  the  administration  is  best  summed  up  in  the  words  of  the 
President:  "Should  such  a work  be  constructed  under  the  common 
protection  of  all  nations,  for  equal  benefits  to  all,  it  would  be 
neither  just  nor  expedient  that  any  great  maritime  state  should 
command  the  communication.  The  territory  through  which  the  canal 
may  be  opened  ought  to  be  freed  from  the  chains  of  any  foreign 
power.  No  such  power  should  occupy  a position  that  would  enable 
it  hereafter  to  exercise  so  controlling  an  influence  over  the  com- 

31 

Cong.  Globe,  op.  cit..  252-253. 

32 

Von  Holst,  Constitutional  History  of  the  United  States. 
Ill,  270.  


, 


-11- 

merce  of  the  world  or  obstruct  a highway  which  ought  to  he  dedi- 
cated to  the  common  uses  of  mankind....  It  is  our  policy  to  en- 
courage every  practicable  route  across  the  Isthmus  which  connects 
North  and  South  America,  either  by  railroad  or  canal, ...  especially 

in  consequence  of  the  absolute  necessity  of  facilitating  inter- 

33 

course  with  our  possessions  on  the  Pacific...." 

Clayton  was  thoroughly  distrustful  of  Hise’s  intentions; 
and  to  checkmate  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  Hise  to  obtain  any 
exclusive  privileges,  he  appointed  Squier  as  American  charge  d’af- 
faires to  succeed  Hise.  furthermore,  the  new  charge  was  to  ne- 
gotiate a treaty  with  Nicaragua;  he  was  "to  claim  no  peculiar 
privilege--no  exclusive  right — no  monopoly  of  commercial  intercourse 
....  If  a charter  or  grant  of  the  right  of  way  shall  have  been  in- 
cautiously or  inconsiderately  made  before  your  arrival  in  that 
country,  seek  to  have  it  properly  modified  to  answer  the  ends  we 

have  in  view....  We  only  ask  an  equal  right  of  passage  for  all 

34 

nations  on  the  same  terms." 

But  Hise  was  the  man  on  the  job,  so  to  speak,  and  seeing 
the  situation  as  it  existed  in  reference  to  the  aggressions  of 
Great  Britain,  he  determined  to  meet  the  issue  by  concluding  a 
treaty  with  Nicaragua.  Accordingly,  on  June  21,  1849,  he  concluded 
a convention  with  Nicaragua  that  gave  the  United  States  the  ex- 
clusive right  to  construct  "a  convenient  communication"  between  the 

33 

Richardson,  Messages , V,  9-24. 

34 

House  Ex.  Doc.,  no.  75,  1st  Sess.  31st  Cong.,  118-130. 


-12- 


Gar  ibbean  and  the  Pacific;  that  both  parties  should  enjoy  equal 

privileges;  that  the  United  States  should  have  the  right  to  fortify 

the  work  anywhere;  that  tolls  should  not  be  levied  on  the  property 

of  the  United  States  or  that  of  its  citizens;  and  that  in  return 

for  all  these  concessions,  the  United  States  was  to  guarantee  the 

35 

political  integrity  of  Nicaragua  in  defensive  wars. 

When  Hise  brought  the  treaty  back  with  him  to  the  United 
States,  it  soon  met  the  disapproval  of  the  administration  and  con- 
firmed the  anticipations  of  Clayton.  He  saw  in  it  a political  al- 
36 

liance.  The  worst  feature  was  that  it  gave  the  United  States 

such  exclusive  rights;  and  he  fully  realised  the  political  capital 

that  his  opponents  could  make  against  him  in  case  he  failed  to  push 

its  ratification.  Should  such  a course  as  that  of  submitting  the 

treaty  to  the  Senate  be  followed,  he  feared  the  demands  of  that 

body  would  bring  on  war  with  Great  Britain  in  view  of  the  inevitable 

37 

conflict  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ban  Juan  river.  No  one  can  question 
the  highmindedness  of  both  Taylor  and  Clayton  in  their  action  re- 
garding the  Hise  treaty.  They  wanted  an  international  canal  and 
were  confident  that  the  matter  could  be  settled  amicably  "by  a 

little  mutual  forbearance"  on  the  part  of  both  C-reat  Britain  and 

38 

the  United  States.  At  the  same  time,  they  knew  that  if  the 


35 

British  and  Foreign  State  Papers , XL,  969-979. 

36 

Cong.  Globe,  op.  cit.,  252-253. 

37 

Crampton  to  Palmerston,  State  Papers,  XL,  955. 

38 

Ibid. , 958. 


-13- 


British  remained  obstinate  and  refused  to  yield  at  all  in  regard 

to  the  hold  on  Greytovn  and  Mosquitia,  they  would  he  compelled  to 

39 

accept  the  treaty  in  self  defense.  This  treaty  was  never  sub- 
mitted to  the  Senate. 


In  the  meantime,  Squier  had  proceeded  to  Nicaragua  and 
had  obtained  the  concession  for  the  American  Atlantic  and  Pacific 


Canal  Company.  On  September  3,  he  obtained  a treaty  with  Nicaragua. 

This  convention  provided  for  the  protection  of  the  property  and 

40 

lives  of  the  members  of  the  canal  company.  As  in  the  Hise  treaty, 

no  tolls  would  be  charged  upon  vessels  belonging  to  the  United 

States  or  its  citizens;  and  such  privileges  were  not  to  accrtie  to 

any  other  nation  unless  it  entered  into  similar  stipulations  for 

41 

the  protection  and  defense  of  the  proposed  canal. 

As  had  been  the  case  with  the  Hise  Treaty,  so  this  one 

of  Squier  was  unsatisfactory,  and  it  was  not  at  the  time  presented 

to  the  Senate.  Clayton  had  become  so  filled  with  the  idea  of  an 

international  canal,  with  no  one  country  possessing  exclusive 

privileges,  that  any  other  solution  was  distasteful  to  him.  He  also 

believed  that  the  two  nations,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, 

should  unite  to  protect  the  neutrality  of  the  waterway,  since  both 

42 

nations  had  common  interests.  It  may  be  that  the  obstinacy  of  the 


39 

Crampton  to  Palmerston,  State  Papers,  XL,  959. 

40 

Ibid. , 980-988. 

n 

Ibid.,  1052-1064. 

42 

Crampton  to  Palmerston,  Oct.  15,  1849.  Ibid. , 966. 


■ 


-14- 

British  in  the  ease  of  the  protection  given  the  Mosquitos  against 

Nicaragua  forced  him  into  such  a compromising  attitude. 

As  Clayton  had  been  persistent  in  his  attempts  to  prevent 

the  construction  of  a canal  under  the  exclusive  control  of  any  na- 

43 

tion,  this  stand  found  an  echo  in  the  attitude  of  Palmerston. 

He  likewise  stoutly  maintained  that  Her  Majesty1 s Government  en- 
tertained no  selfish  designs  on  any  part  of  Central  America.  Be- 
sides, he  wanted  a canal  that  was  to  be  free  and  open  to  the  com- 
merce of  all  nations,  and  he  was  willing  to  receive  any  proposal 
that  would  settle  the  difficulties  at  hand — on  condition  that  the 
communication  should  he  free  and  open  at  all  times.  To  the  constant 
inquiries  of  Lawrence,  United  States  minister  at  St.  James,  as 
to  British  intentions  and  designs,  Palmerston  was  consistent  in 
the  stand  that  Great  Britain  had  no  ulterior  motives.  But  he  did 
have  misgivings  in  regards  to  the  Squier  treaty,  for  In  it  he  saw — or 
thought  he  saw — an  interpretation  that  the  United  States  would  aid 
Nicaragua  in  recovering  Mosquitia.  In  case  that  the  United  States 

would  give  such  aid  and  assist  the  Nicaraguans,  he  informed  Lawrence 

44 

that  Her  Majesty’s  Government  would  oppose  any  interference. 

To  negotiate  a convention  that  would  settle  the  point  at 
issue,  Great  Britain  sent  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  as  minister  plenipoten- 
tiary to  Washington.  His  purposes  went  hand  in  hand  with  those  of 
Clayton.  He,  too,  wanted  England  and  the  United  States  to  unite  in 

43 

Palmerston  to  Crampton,  Nov.  9,  1849.  Ibid.,  961-962. 

44 

Palmerston  to  Lawrence,  Nov.  13,  1849.  Ihid.,  964. 


-15- 


the  g anal  project,  and  he  could  see  no  difficulty  in  attaining  such 

an  agreement  "since  both  countries  were  so  self-denying" , as  he 

45 

expressed  himself.  He  realized  that  it  was  impossible  to  come  to 

an  agreement  with  the  United  States  as  to  Mosquitia;  so  instead  of 

keeping  it  in  the  foreground,  he  wisely  determined  to  keep  it  in  as 

unimportant  a place  as  possible  and  to  settle  that  problem  after 

46 

means  had  been  taken  to  expedite  the  building  of  the  canal. 

The  Senate,  however,  was  growing  restive,  and  soon  took 
a step  that  precipitated  negotiations.  On  Jan.  28,  1850,  a reso- 
lution was  passed  calling  for  the  treaties  and  the  correspondence 
relating  to  Central  America.  Such  men  as  Stephen  A.  Douglas, 

Senator  frcm  Illinois,  were  becoming  uneasy  lest  the  administration 

47 

had  been  bartering  away  the  rights  of  the  United  States.  Bulwer 
as  well  as  Clayton  realized  the  effects  of  turning  all  this  over 
to  the  Senate.  They  saw  that  when  the  instructions  to  Laurence 
were  read,  the  opposition  would  make  political  capital  out  of  the 
revelations  and  would  accuse  the  administration  of  giving  away  a 
most  vital  necessity  of  the  people.  So  then  the  situation  narrowed 
down  to  one  of  two  courses  for  Clayton:  he  must  either  submit  or 
he  must  hold  off  the  Senate  and  the  public  long  enough  to  reach  a 
settlement  with  Great  Britain.  Accordingly  President  Taylor  re- 
fused to  yield  to  the  Senate  at  that  time. 


45 

Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Jan.  6,  1850.  Ibid. , 995. 

46 

Ibid.,  996. 

47 

Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  3,  1850.  Ibid. , 1004. 


. 


*5 


, 

. 


-16- 


Briefly,  then,  the  situation  was  as  follows:  the  United 

States  had  morally  espoused  the  case  of  Nicaragua;  the  canal  had 

become  a national  necessity — but  Great  Britain  blocked  the  way  at 

Greytown  and  showed  no  disposition  to  yield  its  sovereignty  to 

48 

"feeble  Nicaragua;"  in  fact,  Bulwer  held  that  it  was  indeed 

fortunate  that  Her  Majesty's  Government  was  in  such  a position  to 

benefit  mankind,  since  the  United  States  would  otherwise  monopolize 
•49 

the  route. 

A convention  was  soon  drawn  up  on  February  3,  1850.  This 

was  not  entirely  satisfactory,  but  it  settled  the  question  at  issue 

' 50 

namely,  facilitating  the  construction  of  a canal.  Yet  Bulwer  was 
uneasy  and  wanted  the  Mosquito  question  solved,  for  he  felt  that 

the  Americans  were  exaggerating  the  intentions  of  the  English  in 

51 

Central  America.  Palmerston  was  also  very  anxious  for  a speedy 

settlement,  but  at  the  same  time  he  refused  to  change  his  attitude 

' 52 

on  the  Mosquito  protectorate. 

By  the  middle  of  March,  Clayton  seemed  to  have  lost  hope 
in  arriving  at  any  settlement,  and  on  March  19,  President  Taylor 
submitted  the  Squier  treaty  to  the  Senate.  In  his  message  he  as- 


48 

Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  3,  1850.  Ibid.,  1005. 

49  “ 

Ibid. 

50 

Ibid. , 1007. 

51 

Bulwer  to  Palmerston,  Feb.  18,  1850.  Ibid.,  1011-1012. 

52 


Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  Apr.  10,  1850.  Ibid. , 1023. 


-17- 


sailed  the  British  retention  of  the  port  of  San  Juan  in  the  name  of 
the  Mosquito  king  as  being  without  a just  foundation,  and  he  ex- 

53 

pressed  his  intention  to  ratify  the  treaty  should  the  Senate  concur. 

At  the  same  time  Clayton  reassured  Bulwer  that  there  would  he  no 

’ 54 

step  taken  that  would  he  inconsistent  with  their  proposed  draft. 

On  the  19th  of  April,  1850,  the  final  draft  was  signed  hy 
Clayton  and  Bulwer  with  only  a few  minor  modifications  of  the  first 
draft.  It  was  soon  passed  hy  the  Senate  hy  the  vote  of  42-10  on 
May  22. 

What  were  the  terms  of  the  treaty?  Both  governments  de- 
clared that  neither  would  "ever  obtain  or  maintain  for  itself  any 
exclusive  control  over  the  ship-canal";  nor  would  either  nation 
"ever  erect  or  maintain  any  fortifications  commanding  the  same... or 
occupy  or  fortify  or  colonize  or  assume  or  exercise  any  dominion 
over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  Mosquito  Coast  or  any  part  of  Central 
America."  They  were  to  protect  the  persons  and  the  property  of 
those  building  the  canal.  They  were  to  try  to  secure  a free  port 
at  each  end  of  the  canal.  After  it  was  completed,  both  nations 
agreed  to  protect  and  guarantee  the  neutrality  "so  that  the  canal 
may  forever  he  open  and  free."  Other  nations  were  to  he  invited 
"to  enter  into  treaty  stipulations  so  that  all  may  share  in  the 

53 

Richardson,  Messages,  V,  39. 

54 

Clayton  to  Bulwer,  Apr.  19,  1850.  State  Papers , XI, 


1025^  1026 


- 


■ 


-18- 


honor  and  advantage  of  having  contributed  to  a work  of  such  general 
interest  and  importance. n Each  was  to  enter  into  stipulations  with 
Central  American  states  so  as  to  aid  in  carrying  out 'Vne  great 
design  of  the  convention,  namely,  that  of  maintaining  the  canal  for 
the  benefit  of  mankind  on  equal  terms  to  all."  Both  nations  were 
to  support  any  company.  In  the  last  article,  article  VIII,  they 
desired  to  accomplish  "not  only  a particular  object,  but  also  to 
establish  a general  principle,  and  agree  to  extend  their  protec- 
tion to  any  route  across  the  isthmus";  and  all  charges  were  to  be 

55 

"just  and  equitable". 

The  negotiators  were  most  optimistic  as  to  the  future 

of  their  handiwork  and  predicted  that  the  bonds  of  friendship 

would  be  honorably  strengthened  between  the  two  great  kindred  na- 
56 

tions.  Taylor  was  very  enthusiastic  as  to  the  future  of  the 

treaty,  especially  since  it  guaranteed  the  independence  and 

sovereignty  of  all  the  Central  American  Republics  and  the  non- 

57 

exclusiveness  of  a canal. 

The  press  also  felt  very  happy  over  the  outcome.  England 
particularly  welcomed  the  settlement.  The  Times  felt  it  a "relief 
to  turn  from  the  complicated  and  untoward  aspect  of  our  political 
relations  with  the  principal  states  of  Europe  to  the  state  of  our 


55 

Malloy,  Treaties,  I,  659-663;  Cf.  Statutes  at  Large, 

IX,  995-998. 

56 

Bulwer  to  Clayton,  Apr.  19,  1850.  State  Papers,  XL, 
1026-1027.  

57 

Richardson,  Messages . V,  42-44. 


' 


-19- 


affairs  in  a country  where  a totally  different  policy  has  been  pur- 
sued with  a totally  different  result.  It  hoped  that  if  there  had 
been  any  designs  of  the  ministry  in  Central  America,  that  the  "ab- 
surd and  captious  policy  of  setting  up  one  republic  at  the  expense 

58 

of  another"  had  been  abandoned.  The  Spectator,  however,  was  very 

dubious  as  to  the  building  of  the  canal  and  truly  prophesied  that 

in  case  it  was  not  built,  "the  Convention  is  no  more  than  a stale 

and  cumbersome  joke--a  device  to  confer  on  the  ’state  of  Mosquito’ 

some  importance,  but  dragging  down  the  two  great  states  of  Britain 

59 

and  America  into  a burlesque."  Nor  did  the  New  York  Herald,  al- 
though predicting  a commercial  revolution,  see  things  so  brightly, 
for  it  regarded  the  treaty  as  sowing  the  seeds  for  a naval  conflict 

between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  that  would  surpass 

60 

anything  in  the  world’s  history. 

There  was  some  delay,  however,  before  the  final  ratifica- 
tions were  exchanged.  The  British  author iti  es  feared  that  the 
United  States  might  place  an  interpretation  upon  the  treaty  so  as 
to  drive  Great  Britain  out  of  Central  America;  accordingly,  before 
the  Foreign  Office  would  assent  to  ratification,  Bulwer  was  re- 


58 

Editorial  in  the  London  Times,  May  27,  1850.  N.  B.  At 
this  time  British  affairs  on  tne  continent  were  in  a muddle  partly 
due  to  the  aggressive  policies  of  Palmerston.  The  Times  was  an  op- 
ponent of  Palmerston’s  policies  in  regard  to  Europe. 

59 

"Topics  of  the  Day"  in  the  London  Spectator.  June  15, 
1850.  

60 

Editorial  in  the  New  York  Herald,  Apr.  26,  1850.  This 
is  taken  from  The  Times , May  11,  1850. 


-20- 


quest  ed  to  insist  that  the  United  States  make  a declaration  that 

would  agree  with  the  one  dictated  by  the  Foreign  Office  which  was 

as  follows:  ,THer  Majesty  does  not  understand  the  engagements  to 

apply  to  Her  Majesty’s  settlement  in  British  Honduras  or  to  its 
61 

dependencies."  Glayton  very  promptly  yielded,  but  sought  to 

nullify  the  force  of  his  declaration  by  limiting  British  authority 

62 

to  British  Honduras  and  the  small  islands  "in  the  neighborhood." 

Due  ratifications  were  then  exchanged.  Thus,  the  act  was 
consummated  that  gave  Great  Britain  a firm  grip  upon  the  United 
States  so  as  to  prevent  the  building  of  an  "American  canal",  and 
in  fact,  prevented  the  construction  of  any  canal. 


61 

Palmerston  to  Bulwer,  June  8,  1850.  State  Papers, 

XL,  1035. 

62 

Olayton  to  Bulwer,  July  4,  1850.  Ibid. , 1039. 


. 


-21- 

CHAPTER  II 

BETWEEN  THE  TREATIES 

Great  as  were  the  expectations  of  all  responsible  parties 
for  the  blissful  path  of  the  treaty,  events  soon  proved  that  it 
would  be  a bone  of  contention  instead  of  a bond  of  peace  between 
the  two  nations. 

The  first  obstacle  to  a mutual  friendly  disposition  was 
the  British  retention  of  the  colony  at  Belize  and  the  fact  that  in 
1852  they  had  made  the  Bay  Islands  a full  colony — basing  all  upon 
the  declarations  made  after  the  treaty  had  been  signed.  Besides, 
there  did  not  seem  to  be  any  indication  that  England  had  the  slight- 
est intention  of  giving  up  the  Mosquitos  to  the  Nicaraguans;  in 
fact,  she  interpreted  the  treaty  as  justifying  such  a course  as 
she  was  pursuing.'5' 

Another  obstacle  was  the  political  situation  in  the  United 

States.  The  Democrats  seized  upon  the  golden  opportunity  to  assert 

themselves  as  anti-British;  if  nothing  else,  to  oppose  the  treaty 

2 

because  it  had  been  made  by  a Whig  Administration.  When  the  decla- 
rations were  presented  to  the  Senate  on  January  4,  1853,  the  storm 
broke.  The  Democrats  claimed  that  the  treaty  as  signed  was  the  only 
authentic  document  and  not  the  declarations,  and  that  it  excluded 
the  British  from  Central  America  entirely.  In  view  of  her  actions, 
then,  England  had  violated  the  treaty. 

1 

Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty.  143. 

2 

Cong.  Globe,  2nd  Sess.,  32nd  Cong.,  App.,  177. 

3 

Ibid. . 171ff. 


-22- 

Yet  another  impediment  was  the  expedition  of  Walker  and 

his  filibusters.  The  American  public  had  aided  and  abetted  these, 

and  the  administration  also  encouraged  them  by  its  failure  to  stop 

them.  The  British  saw  nothing  in  these  attempts  but  the  extension 

of  the  boundaries  of  the  United  States  and  the  expansion  of  slavery; 

consequently , when  the  feeble  republics  turned  to  the  British  for 

4 

aid,  it  was  soon  forthcoming.  It  was  this  that  led  to  the  down- 
fall of  Walker  and  as  a result,  it  seemed  that  peace  between  the 
two  countries  was  near  an  end. 

In  May,  1856,  an  attempt  was  made  to  settle  the  points  at 
issue:  that  is, the  controversy  arising  over  the  British  seizure 

of  the  Bay  Islands  which  to  the  United  States  was  a violation  of  the 
treaty;  the  continual  conflict  between  Nicaragua  and  Mosquitia,  the 
latter  being  aided  and  abetted  by  England;  and  the  British  reten- 
tion of  the  colony  at  Belize,  which  fact  also  was  considered  by  the 
United  States  as  a violation  of  the  treaty.  The  Dallas-Clarendon 
Treaty  was  then  negotiated.  It  confirmed  British  claims  in  Belize, 
gave  Honduras  legal  control  over  the  Bay  Islands,  recognized  the 
sovereignty  of  Nicaragua  over  Ureytown,  and  gave  to  the  Mosquitos 
some  territory  in  addition  to  their  indemnification  by  Nicaragua.^ 
Everything  was  favorable  to  its  ratification.  But  when  the  Presi- 
dent submitted  it  to  the  Senate,  that  body  proceeded  to  make  numer- 
ous amendments.  England  accepted  all  but  the  amendment  that  demand- 
ed the  absolute  control  of  Honduras  over  the  Bay  Islands,  and 

4 

Travis,  Glayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  185. 

5 

Ibid. . 179. 


* • ’ 


. 


. , 


- 

N 

t ' 

* 

-23- 

off  ered  a new  treaty  with  the  Senate  amendments  minus  the  one 

£ 

mentioned.  The  Senate  refused  to  agree  to  this. 

Thus  affairs  stood  by  the  latter  part  of  the  decade,  and 
President  Buchanan  viewed  the  situation  as  well-nigh  hopeless  to 
the  extent  that  he  advised  mutual  abrogation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty.7  The  Senate  failed  to  take  such  a stand.  Fortunately  for 
both  countries  the  British  Foreign  Office  was  pacific  and  soon 
negotiated  a treaty  with  Honduras  in  1859  that  fully  restored  the 
Bay  Islands  to  Honduras  with  no  other  restrictions  than  that  British 

Q 

subjects  were  to  have  religious  freedom.0  Again,  in  1860  the  Britisi 
signed  a treaty  with  Nicaragua:  Oreytown  was  to  be  made  a free 

port  and  the  British  were  to  relinquish  their  protectorate  over 
Mosquitia.  In  return,  Nicaragua  was  to  grant  the  Mosquitos  some 

Q 

territory  and  an  indemnity.  These  treaties  were  a great  relief  to 
Buchanan,  for  in  his  message  in  December,  1860,  he  announced  that 
"the  dangerous  questions  arising  from  the  Olayton-Bulwer  Treaty 
have  been  amicably  and  honorably  adjusted."1^ 

But  as  yet  there  was  no  canal  nor  could  there  be  expected 
to  be  any  progress  made  when  the  two  nations  who  were  to  protect  the 
construction  were  at  loggerheads  with  each  other.  The  Americans 
soon  became  involved  in  the  Civil  War.  The  British  made  no  attempt 

6 

Travis,  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  180. 

7 

Richardson,  Messages , V,  444. 

8 

State  Papers.  XLIX.  3-26. 

9 

Ibid. . L,  106-126. 

10 

Richardson,  Messages . V,  639. 


_ 


, 


. 


.. 

- 

• 

. 

/ 

. 

-24- 

to  built  it.  The  situation  remained  the  same  until  Colombia  made  a 
concession  to  De  Lesseps  and  a group  of  French  capitalists  in  1878. ^ 

This  incident  aroused  the  United  States  from  its  lethargy 
in  regard  to  a canal,  and  a change  in  policy  followed.  The  reasons 
for  the  change  of  policy  are  obvious.  In  the  first  place,  there  was 
a lingering  distrust  of  the  European  powers  because  of  their  attitude 
during  the  Civil  War.  The  public  had  not  forgotten  the  British 
sympathy  with  the  South  nor  the  French  invasion  in  Mexico  when  our 
hands  were  tied.  In  the  second  place,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  get- 
ting to  be  a part  of  the  national  consciousness  more  than  ever  be- 
fore; and  the  Americans  knew  that  in  case  a canal  were  built  under 
the  guarantee  of  neutrality  by  Europeans  they  all  would  have  to  keep 
troops  in  the  canal  zone  continually  for  protection  from  the  chronic 
rebellions  in  Central  America.  Hence,  President  Hayes  sounded  the 
first  call  for  an  "American  canal"  in  his  message  in  December,  1880. 
In  case  that  any  treaties  would  prevent  such  control,  then  said 
Hayes,  "Suitable  steps  should  be  taken  by  just  and  liberal  negotia- 
tions to  promote  and  establish  the  American  policy  on  this  subject 
consistently  with  the  rights  of  the  nations  to  be  affected  by  it.... 

It  is  the  right  and  duty  of  the  United  States  to  assert  and  maintain 

12 

such  supervision  and  authority  over  any  interoceanic  canal." 

It  was  not  until  the  next  administration,  however,  that 
efforts  were  made  to  carry  out  the  suggestion  made  by  Hayes. 

11 

Travis.  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty.  205. 

12 

Richardson,  Messages . VII,  585. 


-25- 

Jam  es  Gr.  Blaine  became  the  new  Secretary  of  State,  and  it  was  not 
long  before  he  had  a chance  to  open  the  question.  For  some  time 
the  European  press  had  been  advocating  a combination  of  the  powers 
to  guarantee  the  neutrality  of  a trans -isthmian  canal. ^ So  per- 
sistent was  this  propaganda  that  Blaine  felt  that  the  time  had  come 
for  the  United  States  to  take  a stand  in  regard  to  any  such  agree- 
ment. Accordingly,  he  wrote  to  James  Russell  Lowell,  who  was  the 
American  minister  at  the  Court  of  St.  James,  that  in  case  he  found 
plans  under  way  to  interfere  in  the  isthmus,  he  was  to  intimate  that 
the  United  States  would  consider  such  action  as  an  "uncalled-for  in- 
trusion”. It  was  at  this  time  that  Blaine  set  forth  the  policy  that 
helped  to  guide  one  of  his  successors,  John  Hay.  This  dictum  was 
as  follows:  "Nor  in  time  of  peace,  does  the  United  States  seek  to 

have  any  exclusive  privileges  accorded  to  American  ships  in  respect 
to  precedence  or  tolls  through  an  interoceanis  canal  any  more  than 
it  has  sought  like  privileges  for  American  goods  in  transit  over  the 
Panama  Railroad,  under  the  exclusive  control  of  an  American  corpora- 
tion” 

In  November  of  the  same  year  Blaine  sought  a modification 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty.  In  the  first  place,  his  main  reasons 
were,  that  at  the  time  of  the  negotiation  of  the  above  treaty  Amer- 
ican capital  was  not  strong  enough  to  undertake  the  construction  of 

13 

Blaine  to  Lowell,  June  24,  1881.  Senate  Documents, 
no.  237,  1st  Sess.,  56th  Cong.,  380. 

14 

Ibid.,  381. 


-26- 

the  canal  but  the  times  had  changed  and  now  the  United  States  cap- 
italists were  able  to  carry  it  out  and  assistance  was  unnecessary.^ 
In  the  second  place,  the  United  States  was  unwilling  to  perpetuate 
any  treaty  that  impeached  our  right  and  our  long-established  claim 
to  priority  on  the  American  continent.  In  the  third  place,  the  time 
had  come  for  the  United  States  to  have  absolute  control  as  a measure 
of  self-defense  and  to  have  the  right  to  exclude  an  enemy's  vessels 
in  time  of  war. 

Blaine's  way  out  of  the  difficulty  was  to  cancel  the 
clause  prohibiting  fortifications,  to  retain  the  clause  that  kept 
both  nations  from  making  any  territorial  acquisitions,  to  establish 
free  ports,  and  to  remove  the  article  that  invited  other  nations  to 
guarantee  the  neutrality  of  the  canal.  ' There  is  no  doubt  that  he 
was  sincere  in  his  efforts  for  a modification.  He  considered  the 
Convention  of  1850  as  the  only  cause  for  any  quarrels  between  the 
two' nations,  and  he  regarded  it  as  "mi sunder standingly  entered  into, 

imperfectly  comprehended,  contradictorily  interpreted,  and  mutually 

18 

vexatious" • 

Lord  Granville,  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  soon  re- 
plied to  this.  He  held  that  the  canal  was  for  the  benefit  of  the 
whole  world  and  therefore  should  be  on  an  international  basis;  that 
when  the  United  States  should  begin  to  fortify  the  route,  then  the 

15 

Blaine  to  Lowell,  Nov.  19,  1881.  Senate  Document , 
no.  237,  1st  Sess.,  56th  Cong.,  380. 

16 

Ibid.,  385-388. 

17 

Ibid.,  388-390. 

18 

Blaine  to  Lowell,  Nov.  29,  1881.  Ibid.,  395. 


. 


, 


. 


' 


-27- 

Central  American  states  concerned  would  soon  cease  to  be  independent; 
that  the  principles  of  the  negotiators  were  sound,  and  that  this  was 
an  opportune  time  for  other  powers  to  enter  into  the  capacity  of  a 
guarantor;  that  there  was  no  need  for  any  settlement,  because  that 
had  already  been  settled  in  the  latter  part  of  the  fifth  decade  of 
the  century  when  Great  Britain  had  yielded  almost  everything  for  the 
sake  of  amity.1" 

Blaine  resigned  his  position  in  the  early  part  of  1852  and 
was  succeeded  by  P.  T.  Frelinghuysen.  The  latter  was  a tactless  and 
brusque  individual  for  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State.  He  deter- 
mined to  carry  on  the  battle  that  Blaine  had  started,  however,  and 
went  to  lengths  that  his  predecessor  had  not  even  contemplated.  He 
accused  the  British  government  of  bad  faith  in  its  dealings  with  the 
United  States  and  the  isthmian  states  by  the  retention  of  British 
Honduras,  an  act  that  was  a flagrant  violation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty;  therefore,  the  treaty  was  "voidable  at  the  pleasure  of  the 
United  States."  Anyway,  he  considered  it  a dead  letter  since  it  had 
been  meant  "to  secure  a thing  which  did  not  exist  and  which  now  never 
could  exist."  It  had  applied  only  to  the  Nicaragua  route  and  the 
one  under  discussion  was  the  Panama  route.  w 

To  such  argument  there  was  only  one  thing  for  Granville 
to  do  and  that  was  to  deny  all  the  allegations  that  had  been  made. 

He  refused  to  abrogate  the  treaty,  and  apparently  irritated  at  the 

19 

Granville  to  West,  Jan.  7,  1882.  Senate  Document, 
no.  237,  1st  Sess.,  56th  Cong. , 397-400;  Granville  to  West,  Jan.  14, 
1882.  Ibid.,  400-409. 

20 

Prelinghuysen  to  Lowell,  May  8,  1882.  Foreign  Relations 
of  the  United  States  1882-1883,  pp.  272-282. 


. 


■ 

. 


< 


-28- 

tone  and  manner  of  Frelinghuysen,  finally  informed  him  that  Great 
Britain  could  see  no  reason  for  changing  her  attitude  and  that  fur- 
ther  discussion  was  of  no  avail.  A But  Frelinghuysen  was  determined 
to  have  the  last  word  and  sent  another  reminder  to  Granville  by  way 
of  Lowell  reminding  him  that  the  British  had  violated  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty  and  that  it  had  lapsed * * 

Frelinghuysen  evidently  meant  all  that  he  had  said,  for 
in  December,  1884,  he  concluded  a treaty  with  Nicaragua  that  gave  the 
United  States  exclusive  rights  in  a canal  that  was  to  be  built  via 
the  Nicaraguan  route.23  But  President  Cleveland  withdrew  it  from 
the  Senate  on  the  basis  that  "Whatever  highway  may  be  constructed 
...  must  be  for  the  world’s  benefit — a trust  for  mankind,  to  be  re- 
moved from  the  chance  of  domination  of  any  single  power,  nor  become 
the  point  of  invitation  for  hostilities  or  a prize  for  warlike  ambi- 
tion.... The  lapse  of  years  has  abundantly  confirmed  the  wisdom  and 
foresight  of  those  earlier  Administrations  which,  long  before  the 
conditions  of  maritime  intercourse  were  changed  and  enlarged  by  the 
progress  of  the  age,  proclaimed  the  vital  need  of  interoeeanic 
transit  across  the  American  Isthmus  and  consecrated  it  in  advance 

to  the  common  use  of  mankind  by  their  positive  declarations  and 

24 

through  the  formal  obligation  of  treaties." 

21 

Granville  to  West,  Dec«30,  1882.,  Senate  Document, 
no.  237,  1st  Sess.,  56th  Cong.,  411-417. 

22 

Frelinghuysen  to  Lowell,  Nov.  22,  1883,  Ibid. , 423-425. 

23 

Senate  Report,  No.  1.  1st  Sess.,  57th  Cong.,  345-352. 

24 

Foreign  Relations  1885,  vi. 


-29- 

The  diplomatic  discussion  of  the  treaty  stopped  for 
several  years.  Once  in  a while  some  statesman  would  make  himself 
heard  regarding  it.  The  canal  question  was  kept  before  the  public 
by  the  Maritime  Oanal  Company.  It  had  been  formed  in  1880,  was  re- 
chartered in  1884,  and  was  incorporated  by  an  Act  of  Congress  in 

25 

1889  after  having  already  received  a concession  from  Nicaragua. 

The  lack  of  funds  drove  the  directors  of  the  company  to  ask  for  the 
aid  of  the  government  of  the  United  States.  Not  much  attention  was 
paid  to  these  requests;  for  it  was  not  until  early  in  1895  that  an 
act  was  finally  passed  which  gave  aid  to  the  company,  and  in  certain 
contingencies  the  government  was  to  be  put  in  almost  complete  con- 
trol.26 

The  ideas  of  Frelinghuysen  had  left  their  imprint,  for  in 
1891  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  issued  a statement  de- 
claring that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  was  obsolete  and  that  the 

United  States  was  no  longer  under  any  obligations  to  act  under  its 

27 

provisions.  Richard  Olney,  Secretary  of  State  in  the  administra- 
tion of  President  Cleveland,  took  a public  stand  that  the  treaty  was 
still  in  existence;  that  if  changes  were  necessary,  the  true  remedy 
was  not  in  ’’ingenuous  attempts  to  deny  the  existence  of  the  treaty 
or  to  explain  away  its  provisions,  but  in  a direct  and  straight  for- 
ward application  to  Great  Britain  for  a reconsideration  of  the 
whole  matter.”26 

25 

Travis.  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty.  240. 

26 

Sen.  Rpt . . No.  1944,  2nd  Sess.,  51st  Cong.,  18. 

27 

Cong.  Record,  part  6,  2nd  Sess.,  63rd  Cong.,  6029. 

Q " - 1 

Root ’ s Addresses  on  International  Sub .jects . 217.  Cf. 
part  2,  3rd  Sess.,  62nd  Cong.,  1818-1825. 


. 


; 


. 


- 


. 

, 


. 


. 


' 


-30- 

The  United  States  public,  however,  was  apparently  indif- 
ferent to  the  building  of  a canal.  It  was  going  through,  as  it  were, 
a period  of  instruction  preoaratory  to  a full  realization  that  a 
canal  was  necessary,  not  only  from  a standpoint  of  commerce  but  of 
national  defense.  An  event  that  contributed  to  this  education  took 
place  during  the  war  with  Spain  when  the  "Oregon"  made  its  historic 
voyage  around  Gape  Horn  to  join  the  Atlantic  fleet.  Another  factor 
was  our  acquisition  of  the  Philippines  and  of  Hawaii,  and  of  our 
rapidly  expanding  commercial  interests  in  China.  The  British  public 
was,  on  the  whole  oblivious  to  the  growing  sentiment  in  the  United 
States  for  a canal.  But  there  were  some  Englishmen  who  felt  that  if 
a canal  was  to  be  built  at  all,  it  must  needs  be. owned,  built,  and 
controlled  by  the  United  States,  and  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
Foreign  Office  to  modify  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  which  had  served 

go 

as  a veto  upon  the  construction  of  any  trans -isthmian  canal.  ^ 

The  relations  between  the  two  countries  had  on  the  whole 
been  friendly  during  the  latter  part  of  the  century.  President 
Cleveland Ts  message  in  1895  relative  to  the  Venezuelan  boundary  dis- 
pute had  nearly  precipitated  the  two  countries  into  war,  but  the 
British  yielded  to  his  demands  for  arbitration  and  the  matter  was 
hushed.  The  aid  that  the  British  had  extended  to  the  United  States 
during  the  Spanish-American  war  was  not  lost  upon  the  American 
public.  It  was  not  disposed  to  forget,  for  a short  time  at  least, 

29 

"Topics  of  the  Bay"  in  The  Spectator . Aug.  27,  1898. 


, 


, 

- 


. 


. 


-31- 

that  it  was  the  stand  of  Great  Britain  which  had  prevented  the 
interference  of  France  and  Germany  on  the  side  of  Spain.  Uor  at  the 
time  had  it  forgotten  the  value  of  the  British  maintenance  of 
neutrality  at  Port  Said  when  the  authorities  refused  to  allow  the 
Spanish  fleet  coal  on  the  way  to  the  Philippines.  During  this  period 
John  Hay,  American  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain,  was  doing  all  that 
he  could  to  cement  the  cordial  relations  of  the  two  countries.  His 
opportunity  to  further  his  aims  came  when  he  was  appointed  Secretary 
of  State  in  September,  1898,  and  took  charge  of  affairs  in  October. ^ 
The  time  for  a reconsideration  of  the  Glayton-Bulwer  Treaty  was  at 
hand;  and  it  was  obvious  that  each  party  would  have  to  yield  some- 
thing in  return  for  a quid  pro  quo  from  the  other. 

The  history  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  has  received 
a brief  treatment,  but  it  has  probably  been  observed  that  at  one 
time  the  United  States  wanted  abrogation,  at  another,  modification; 
that  at  another,  the  United  States  was  so  bold  to  declare  that  such  a 
thing  as  the  treaty  did  not  exist,  and  that  the  last  tendency  had 
been  towards  modification.  Statesmen  have  been  doing  all  the  talking 
but  now  another  element  in  American  government,  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States,  is  to  step  in  and  assert  its  presence,  and  literally 
force  the  issue. 

30 

Thayer,  The  Life  and  Letters  of  John  Hay.  II,  173. 


-32- 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  FIRST  HAY-PAUNCEFOTE  TREATY 

Since  the  interest  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
in  a canal  was  in  a dormant  state,  the  message  of  President  McKinley 
on  December  5,  1898,  served  to  wake  up  the  American  people  to  the 
need  of  a canal.  In  this  message  McKinley  informed  Congress  that 
he  had  learned  that  Nicaragua  had  made  a grant  to  another  associa- 
tion aside  from  the  Maritime  Canal  Company;  and  he  suggested  ’’the 
urgency  of  some  definite  action  hy  Congress  at  this  time  if  the 
labors  of  the  past  are  to  be  utilized  and  the  linking  of  the  At- 
lantic and  Pacific  oceans  by  a practical  waterway  is  to  be  realized 
...and  the  prospective  expansion  of  our  influence  and  commerce  in 
the  Pacific,  and  our  national  policy  now  more  imperatively  than 
ever  calls  for  its  control  by  this  Government  are  propositions 

which  I doubt  not  the  Congress  will  duly  appreciate  and  wisely  act 

1 

upon” . 

The  Senate  got  busy,  and  a bill  was  soon  introduced  that 

provided  for  governmental  aid  to  be  given  to  the  Maritime  Canal 

Company  to  the  extent  of  ov/ning  ninety-two  and  a half  per  cent  of 

the  stock,  virtually  giving  the  United  States  the  ownership  and  the 

2 

control  of  the  canal  when  completed.  Senator  Morgan  was  the 
leader  of  the  canal  votaries.  He  had  made  a study  of  the  canal  prob- 
lem and  was  enthusiastic  for  a Nicaraguan  canal  at  any  price. 

1 

Foreign  Relations  1898,  lxxi. 

2 

Cong.  Record,  part  1,  3rd  Sess.,  55th  Cong.,  895. 


-33- 


In  the  discussion  of  the  bill,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
the  Senators  soon  found  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  stood  in  the 
way.  Some  regarded  the  treaty  as  having  died  a natural  death  owing 
to  the  change  of  conditions  and  had  vanished  into  "thin  air,"  while 

3 

others  felt  that  the  bill  was  not  a violation  of  the  treaty  at  all. 
There  was  a realization  that  the  rapid  expanse  of  our  relations  in 
the  Orient  was  now  demanding  a canal.  The  South  was  very  anxious 
because  of  the  expanding  cotton  trade  with  Japan  and  Ohina.  There 
was  considerable  opposition,  however,  to  plunging  headlong  into 
what  many  felt  to  be  an  open  violation  of  the  treaty,  and  although 
amendments  asking  for  negotiations  were  voted  down,  this  opposition 
was  strong  enough  to  delay  precipitate  action,  at  least  for  a time. 
One  thing  may  be  noticed  and  that  is  that  there  was  little  tendency 
for  exclusive  control  in  the  matter  of  tolls.  All  this  debate  in 
the  Senate  had  its  effect  upon  Hay  who  feared  dangerous  conse- 
quences from  all  the  debate  since  the  Senators  would  commit  them- 
selves in  a way  that  would  prevent  them  accepting  any  arrangement 

4 

that  might  be  made.  Nevertheless,  the  bill  passed  on  January  21, 

5 

1899,  by  a vote  of  48-6,  with  36  not  voting. 

The  House  of  Representatives  was  also  alive  to  the  demands 
of  not  only  the  President  but  also  the  people,  for  petitions  were 


3 

For  the  debate,  see  the  Gong.  Record,  part  1,  3rd  Sess., 
55th  Cong.,  during  the  months  of  Dec.  1898  and  Jan.  1899. 

4 

Hay  to  White,  Jan.  13,  1899.  Thayer,  John  Hay,  II,  216. 

5 

Cong.  Record,  part  1,  3rd  Sess.,  55th  Cong.,  911. 


. 

. 

. 

• 

' 


' 

• 

. 


. 


-34- 


being  made  asking  for  the  construction  of  a canal  under  the  owner- 
ship of  the  United  States.  The  result  was  the  Hepburn  bill,  intro- 
duced early  in  December  of  1898,  which  provided  for  the  construction 

6 

of  a canal  by  the  United  States.  This  bill  instantly  met  the  dis- 
approval of  Hay  who  considered  it  not  only  an  evasion  of  the  Olay- 
ton-Bulwer  Treaty  but  an  open  violation  of  it;  consequently,  he 

preferred  that  the  question  of  United  States  control  should  first 

7 

go  through  diplomatic  channels. 

The  message  also  served  to  awaken  the  British  public  to 

a realization  that  the  United  States  needed  the  canal  and  would 

control  it,  and  that  English  capital  was  not  disposed  to  finance 

the  building  of  one;  therefore,  there  was  no  reason  for  a continua- 

8 

tion  of  the  Olayt on-Bulwer  Treaty.  Englishmen  were  willing  to 
modify  it  on  the  condition  that  the  canal  should  be  international 
in  character,  free  and  open  on  equal  terms  to  all  nations.  The 
attitude  of  the  British  is  best  summed  up  in  an  editorial  of  The 
Times : "On  the  one  hand,  our  treaty  rights  are  undeniable  and 

unassailable.  We  have  paid  for  them,  we  have  got  them,  and  we 
cannot  be  expected  to  surrender  them  for  nothing.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  are  quite  ready  to  admit  that  while  our  interests  in  the 
canal  scheme  are  large,  those  of  America  are  vital.  We  acknowledge 


6 

Pong.  Record,  part  2,  3rd  Sess.,  55th  Gong.,  133. 

7 

Hay  to  Ohoate,  Jan.  15,  1900.  Thayer,  John  Hay,  II, 

222,  223. 

8 

"Topics  of  the  Day”  in  The  Spectator , Dec.  10,  1898; 
editorial  in  The  Times,  Dec.  6,  1898. 


. 


-35- 


accomplished  facts  when  they  confront  ns,  and  amongst  such  facts  we 

9 

recognize  the  superior  interests  of  the  United  States  in  the  Canal." 

The  Spectator  in  a similar  vein  said:  "Let  us  show  the  world  that, 

though  in  the  case  of  foreigners  we  shall  tie  tenacious  of  our  treaty 

rights  to  the  last  iota,  we  can  in  the  case  of  our  own  kith  and  kin 

10 

think  of  their  interests  as  well  as  our  own".  The  speeches  of 

such  men  as  Chamberlain  and  Balfour  always  portrayed  a distinctly 

11 

kindly  feeling  towards  the  United  States,  all  of  which  was  ob- 
served by  our  incoming  ambassador,  Joseph  H.  Choate,  when  he  ar- 
rived in  England  in  February,  1899 . On  the  other  hand,  there  was  an 
element  of  distrust  of  the  United  States  friendship  for  Great  Bri- 
tain as  seen  in  a pungent  criticism  of  the  America  by  the  Saturday 
Review.  This  proverbially  anti-American  paper  seemed  uneasy  about 
the  canal  question.  Referring  to  the  discourtesy  shorn  towards 
Canada  in  the  matter  of  a discriminatory  tariff,  this  weekly  said: 
"Whether  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  and  our  interests  will  be  treated 

with  the  same  scant  courtesy  remains  to  be  seen.  Ghangeableness  is 

12 

the  one  certain  thing  of  American  politics". 

The  State  Department  of  the  United  States  government  was 
fully  aware  of  the  conditions  as  they  existed;  namely,  that  state 


9 

Editorial  in  The  Times,  Feb.  14,  1899. 

10 

"Topics  of  the  Day"  in  The  Spectator,  Dec.  10,  1898. 

11 

News  articles  in  The  Times,  Dec.  10.  1898  and  Jan. 31. 

1899. 

12 

Editorial  in  the  Saturday  Review,  Jan.  21,  1899. 


-36- 


aid  was  necessary  to  the  construction  of  a canal;  that  when  the 

people  demanded  a canal  Congress  would  act  accordingly;  that  the 

Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  stood  in  the  way  of  a canal  as  the  public 

wanted  it;  and  that  in  the  event  of  such  responsive  legislation, 

there  would  be  a violation  of  a recognized  treaty  which  would  injure 

13 

the  foreign  relations  of  the  United  States  everywhere.  As  a re- 
sult, the  department  wanted  to  modify  it  without  affecting  the 

14 

’’general  principle  of  neutralization".  Hay  was  determined  that  as 
long  as  he  was  Secretary  of  State  no  action  would  be  taken  con- 
trary to  his  conviction  that  the  one  indispensable  feature  of  the 

foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  should  be  a friendly  under  - 

15 

standing  with  England. 

Accordingly,  early  in  December,  1898,  Hay  instructed 

Henry  White,  American  charge  d'affaires  in  London,  to  sound  Lord 

Salisbury,  who  at  that  time  was  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  as 

16 

to  his  attitude.  Lord  Salisbury  was  willing  to  modify  the  treaty 

on  the  condition  that  the  canal  should  be  open  to  all  nations  on 

17 

equal  terms.  No  time  was  lost  in  framing  a draft  of  a new  treaty, 


13 

Hay  to  Choate,  Jan.  15,  1900.  Thayer,  John  Hay,  11,221. 

14 

S ena te  Document , no.  474,  2nd  Sess.,  63rd  Cong.,  13; 
Parliamentary  Paoers,  U.  S.  no.  1,  1901,  XCI,  3. 

15 

Hay  to  Choate,  Sept.  24,  1899.  Thayer,  John  Hay,  II, 

221.  ‘ 

16 

Hay  to  White,  Dec.  7,  1898.  Sen.  Doc.,  no.  474,  op . 

cit. , 2. 

17 

White  to  Hay,  Dec.  22,  1898.  Ibid. , 3. 


' 


-37- 

which  was  concluded  by  Lord  Pauncefote,  English  Ambassador  at 

18 

Washington,  and  Secretary  Hay,  on  January  11,  1899. 

But  this  treaty  was  not  accepted  at  once.  It  soon  became 
evident  that  the  proposal  would  become  mixed  up  with  other  points 
at  issue  between  the  two  countries.  There  was  the  old  question  of 
the  fur-seal  fishery  as  yet  unsettled,  the  dispute  over  the  alien 
labor  laws,  reciprocity  and  other  controversial  points.  The  point 
most  at  issue  at  this  time  was  the  dispute  over  the  boundary  of 
Alaska  and  Canada's  demand  for  a seaport  from  her  portion  of  the 
Klondike  region.  Canada  used  this  opportunity  to  try  to  get  some 
concession  from  the  United  States  in  return  for  any  rights  England 
was  giving  up  in  the  case  of  the  proposed  Hay-Pauncef ote  Treaty. 

The  existing  ministry  was  disposed  to  yield  to  the  Canadian  pres- 
sure for  fear  that  the  public  would  not  sustain  it;  c onsequently, 

19 

there  was  no  action  taken  upon  the  treaty. 

Fortunately,  however,  events  were  moving  in  such  a way 
as  to  revive  the  good  feeling  between  the  two  countries  that  had 
seemed  to  slacken  during  the  simmer.  In  September,  when  the  English 
war  with  the  Boers  broke  out,  the  United  States  immediately  issued 
a proclamation  of  neutrality,  and  the  American  consulate  at  Pre- 
toria took  over  British  interests.  The  British  had  been  in  thorough 
sympathy  with  the  American  policy  in  suppressing  the  Filipinos,  as 
taking  up  the  "white  man's  burden",  and  now  the  people  of  the 

18 

Lansdowne  to  Pauncefote,  Feb.  22,  1901.  Sen.  Doc. , no. 
474,  on.  cit.,  13. 

19 

Ibid.;  editorial  in  The  Times,  May  26,  1899. 


. 


: 


-38- 


Uni  ted  States  at  this  time  seemed  to  have  a realization  of  the 

20 

problem  of  the  British  in  the  Transvaal.  Further,  the  decision  of 
the  arbitration  commission  relative  to  the  Venezuelan  boundary  dis- 
pute was  made  on  October  3,  1899,  largely  in  favor  of  the  British 

21 

claims.  Most  important  for  its  direct  relation  to  the  canal 

question  was  the  agreement  in  October  between  the  United  States  and 

England  to  a modus  vivendi  in  regard  to  the  Alaskan  boundary  dis- 
22 

pute.  Hence,  the  situation  in  the  fall  caused  Ohoate  to  believe 

23 

that  relations  had  never  been  closer  since  1783. 

In  the  meantime,  the  United  States  was  investigating 
routes  for  a canal.  The  Isthmian  Oanal  Commission  was  at  work  at 
such  a task.  Moreover,  the  impetus  for  a canal  was  gradually 
gathering  momentum.  All  this  made  the  British  ministry  uneasy,  be- 
cause it  saw  the  temper  of  the  Senate  and  feared  that  it  might  force 
the  administration  to  yield.  Such  a c ontingency  would  most  surely 
have  injured  the  amicable  relations  then  existing;  and  the  ministry 

set  about  to  forestall  such  an  eventuality  by  yielding  to  the 

24 

United  States  as  a proof  of  British  friendship. 

Consequently,  a treaty  was  concluded  and  signed  at  Washing- 


20 

See  The  Times  all  during  the  summer  and  fall  of  1899, 
especially  the  editorial,  Nov.  10,  1899. 

21 

Article  in  The  Times,  Oct.  4,  1899. 

22 

Dunning,  The  British  Empire  and  the  United  States,  330. 

23 

Speech  in  The  Times,  Dec.  11,  1899. 

24 

Lansdowne  to  Pauncefote,  Feb.  22,  1901.  Sen.  Doc.,  no. 

474,  13-14. 


-39- 


ton  on  the  5th  of  February,  1900,  to  facilitate  the  construction  of 
some  canal  by  the  United  States  without  impairing  the  general  prin- 
ciple of  neutralization  established  in  Article  VIII  of  the  Clayton- 
25 

Bulwer  treaty.  A summary  of  the  treaty  is  as  follows.  The 
United  States  was  to  have  the  right  to  construct,  regulate,  and 
manage  the  canal.  Both  countries  were  to  preserve  the  neutraliza- 
tion features  of  the  Clayt on-Bulwer  Treaty.  Also,  the  canal  was  to 
be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of  commerce  and  of  war  of  all  na- 
tions, in  time  of  peace  as  in  time  of  war,  on  equal  terms.  There 
was  a number  of  clauses  that  concerned  the  action  of  belligerents 
in  the  canal,  but  the  most  important  one  was  one  that  prevented  the 
United  States  from  making  any  fortifications  along  the  route.  Last- 
ly, one  article  provided  that  other  nations  were  to  be  invited  to 
enter  into  treaty  stipulations  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the 
proposed  treaty. 

On  the  same  day  that  it  was  signed,  the  treaty  was  pre- 
sented to  the  Senate.  Immediately  the  storm  broke.  The  State 
Department  was  roundly  accused  as  being  unmindful  of  the  country's 

26 

honor  and  the  glory  of  the  flag  and  as  being  derelict  in  its  duty. 
All  this  storm  of  disapproval  seemed  "mere  spite"  to  Hay,  and  he  ap- 
pealed to  Senator  Lodge  to  champion  the  treaty  in  the  Senate  and  to 

27 

use  hie  influence  to  prevent  any  amendments.  This  plea,  however, 


25 

Lansdowne  to  Pauncefote,  Feb.  22,  1901.  Sen.  Doc. , no. 
474,  289-291. 

26 

Hay  to  Choate,  Feb.  6,  1900.  Thayer,  John  Hay, II,  224. 
27 

Ibid. , 223. 


. 


-40- 


fell  on  deaf  ears.  Nor  did  he  derive  any  sympathy  from  Roosevelt 
who  at  that  time  was  Governor  of  New  York,  He  regarded  Hay*s  posi- 
tion as "incomprehensible”,  and  as  a step  backward  and  "fraught  with 
mischief".  Although  he  would  back  the  administration  as  heartily 
as  ever,  he  earnestly  hoped  that  Hay  and  McKinley  would  drop  the 
treaty  and  push  through  a bill  "to  build  and  fortify  our  own  canal". 
His  first  objection  was  that  it  was  a false  naval  policy  which  would 
allow  an  enemy's  ships  to  pass  through  the  canal.  In  the  second 
place,  he  wanted  the  canal  fortified.  And  his  other  objection  was 
that  the  invitation  to  other  powers  was  a violation  of  the  Monroe 

Doctrine  and  was  setting  a precedent  for  joint-ownership  over  any 

28 

part  of  South  America  — which  situation  would  not  at  all  have  been 

to  his  liking.  Hay  received  some  consolation,  however,  from  the 

ministers  of  the  Central  American  States  all  of  whom  approved  of 

29 

the  non-fortifications  provision.  Many  newspapers  came  to  his 
aid,  such  as  the  New  York  Tribune,  which  felt  gratification  "at 
so  happy  an  ending  of  an  ancient  and  sometimes  vexatious  controver- 
sy.... The  vast  majority  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  will, 

30 

we  are  convinced,  hail  the  signing  and  ratification  with  great  joy." 
As  to  fortifications,  it  likewise  upheld  him: "The  question  seems  to 


28 

Roosevelt  to  Dr.  Albert  Shaw.  Bishop,  Theodore  Roose- 
velt , I,  144,  also,  Roosevelt  to  Hay,  Feb.  18,  1900,  I,  144,  145; 
Thayer,  Theodore  Roosevelt,  180-181. 

29 

Hay  to  C.  K.  Davis,  Feb.  8,  1900.  Thayer,  John  Hay, 

II,  224. 

30 

Editorial  in  The  New  York  Tribune,  Feb.  6,  1900. 


I 


-41- 


be  whether  the  United  States  is  big  enough  and  brave  enough  and 
strong  enough  to  open  this  canal  to  the  world  and  trust  its  own 
ability  to  cope  with  whatever  improbable  emergencies  may  arise,  or 
is  so  given  to  seeing  ghosts  that  it  must  line  the  canal  with 
fortresses  and  sit  up  o'  night  to  watch  lest  some  bad  pirate  enter 


The  British  response  was  on  the  whole  rather  favorable. 
There  was  some  annoyance,  however,  at  the  reception  of  the  treaty 
by  the  Senate.  Englishmen  seemed  to  regard  the  treaty  only  as  a 
great  concession  from  Great  Britain.  This  resignation  was  hard  to 
swallow  since  they  thought  that  the  Foreign  Office  had  let  Canada 
go  a-begging. 

Early  in  March,  Hay  had  become  very  doubtful  of  the  treaty’s 
33 

passing  the  Senate.  On  March  9,  the  report  of  the  Foreign  Rela- 
tions Committee  was  made.  This  told  a brief  history  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty  and  recognized  its  validity.  As  to  American  policy  in 
regard  to  a canal,  the  committee  said:  "Ho  American  statesman  speak- 
ing with  official  authority  or  responsibility,  has  ever  intimated 
that  the  United  States  would  attempt  to  control  this  canal  for  the 
exclusive  benefit  of  our  government  or  people.  They  have  all  with 


31 

Editorial  in  The  New  York  Tribune,  Feb.  7,  1900. 

32 

"Topics  of  the  Day"  in  The  Spectator,  Feb.  24,  1900; 
editorial  in  The  Times,  Feb.  26,  1900;  edi torial  in  the  Saturday 
Review,  Feb.  10. 

33 

Hay  to  Choate,  Mar.  7,  1900.  Thayer,  John  Hay,  II,  225. 


. 


-42- 


one  accord,  declared  that  the  canal  was  to  he  neutral  ground  in 

time  of  war,  and  always  open  on  terms  of  impartial  equality  to  the 

ships  and  commerce  of  the  world....  We  will  never  find  it  necessary 

to  differentiate  our  rates  of  toll  in  favor  of  our  own  people  in 

order  to  secure  a very  great  profit  on  the  investment.”  It  then 

recommended  the  passage  of  the  treaty  with  the  amendment  that  none 

of  the  provisions  of  Article  III  were  to  apply  to  any  measures  that 

34 

the  United  States  might  take  for  its  own  safety.  This  was  called 
the  Davis  Amendment  in  honor  of  the  chairman  of  the  Gommittee, 
Senator  Cushman  X.  Davis.  Thoroughly  disgusted  with  what  he  con- 
sidered a crime  by  the  Senate  and  annoyed  by  the  adverse  criticism, 

Hay  offered  his  resignation  to  the  President.  This,  of  course,  was 

35 

instantly  refused. 

The  Hepburn  Bill  was  now  again  before  the  House.  In  the 

debate  over  its  provisions,  there  was  a noticeable  hostility 

towards  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  not  only  from  the  Democrats  but 

36 

from  the  Republicans.  The  extent  of  the  opposition  is  plainly 
shown  in  the  vote  upon  the  bill  on  May  3,  the  yeas  numbering  224 
and  the  nays  only  36,  with  84  not  voting.  The  bill,  as  passed, 
gave  the  President  the  authority  to  purchase  the  territory  for  a 
canal  and  to  take  proper  measures  for  its  defense;  and  the  construe 


34 

Sen.  Doc . , no.  268,  1st  Sess.,  56th  Cong.;  Sen.  Rpt . , 
no.  1,  1st  Sess.  57th  Cong.,  421-435. 

35 

Hay  to  McKinley,  Mar.  13,  1900,  Thayer,  John  Hay,  II, 
227;  also  McKinley  to  Hay,  Mar.  13,  1900.  Ibid. 

36 

Con£.  Rec. , part  6,  1st  Sess.,  56th  Cong.  Debate  on 

May  2,  1900. 


-43- 

tion  was  to  be  under  the  supervision  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  The 

President  was  to  withhold  action,  however,  until  it  was  seen  how 

the  Senate  was  to  act  in  regard  to  the  treaty  before  it.  Thus  the 

House  had  taken  a stand  unalterably  opposed  to  the  treaty  and  to  the 

37 

administration.  It  desired  an  American  canal  and  naturally  re- 
flected the  attitude  of  the  American  public.  When  one  considers 
the  fact  that  a presidential  election  was  approaching,  another 
interpretation  may  be  put  upon  the  vote. 

All  of  these  actions  by  the  House  and  the  report  of  the 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  dismayed  the  British  public  for  it  saw 
the  best  relations  with  the  United  States  vanishing.  Then,  in  addi- 
tion, the  campaign  of  1900  was  approaching,  and  those  who  were 
nervous  of  a breaking  of  good  relations  warned  the  public  to  be 
calm  and  to  swallow  the  hard  things  that  would  be  said  in  the  heat 
of  the  campaign  against  England  and  to  consider  the  circumstances. 
There  was  much  opposition  to  the  Davis  amendment,  for  it  was  re- 
garded as  a consequent  subversion  of  neutrality.  Besides,  the 

English  regarded  the  Foreign  Office  as  having  gone  as  far  as  it 

38 

could  to  retain  an  amicable  understanding. 

Nor  were  their  anticipations  wrong.  In  the  coming  presi- 
dential campaign  in  which  imperialism  was  the  "paramount  issue"  and 
opposition  to  the  gold  standard  had  not  wholly  died  down,  and  where 

37 

Cong.  Record,  part  6,  1st  Sess.,  56th  Cong.  Debate  on 
May  2,  1900,  5015. 

38 

Editorial  in  The  Times,  Mar.  3,  1900;  "Topics  of  the 
Day"  in  The  Spectator , Apr.  l4,  1900. 


_ 


, 


« 


-44- 

it  was  "good  politics”  to  get  the  Irish  and  the  German  vote,  it  was 

to  be  expected  that  Great  Britain  would  come  in  for  a large  amount 

of  abuse,  since  she  was  considered  our  national  temptress.  The 

Republican  party  advocated  the  construction  of  a canal  owned  and 

39 

protected  by  the  government,  but  for  political  reasons  it  was  no 
more  than  lukewarm  towards  the  treaty  under  discussion.  The  Demo- 
cratic party  also  declared  for  the  construction,  ownership,  and 
control  of  a canal  by  the  United  States;  but  it  denounced  the  Re- 
publicans as  being  insincere  because  they  had  failed  to  push  through 
the  Hepburn  Bill  even  though  they  had  a majority.  It  also  con- 
demned the  Hay-Pauncefo te  Treaty  "as  a surrender  of  American  in- 

40 

terests  not  to  be  tolerated  by  the  American  people."  But  the 

traditional  howling  against  Great  Britain  proved  to  no  avail,  and 

the  Republicans  returned  McKinley  to  the  White  House. 

When  Congress  met  again  in  December,  President  McKinley 

41 

urged  the  Senate  to  give  early  attention  to  the  pending  treaty. 

It  soon  became  evident  that  there  would  be  more  amendments  to  the 
treaty  than  the  Davis  amendment.  There  was  an  assumption  that  be- 
cause of  her  desire  for  our  friendship,  England  would  yield,  no  mat- 
ter what  the  Senate  demanded,  and  that  after  all  she  was  not  inter- 
ested in  the  canal.  The  Times  did  not  hesitate  to  deny  any  such 
feeling.  It  regarded  the  British  as  being  calm  because  they  con- 


39 

Stanwood,  History  of  the  Presidency  from  1897  to  1916, 

150. 

40 

Ibid.,  62. 

41 

Foreign  Relations  1900 , xxv. 


' 


. 


-45- 


si  dered  their  moral  and  legal  position  as  unassailable;  it  deplored 
the  attitude  of  the  Senate  and  if  it  adhered  to  its  apparent 
policy,  Englishmen  would  simply  fall  back  on  their  rights  under  the 
old  treaty:  "We  shall  stand  upon  those  rights.  It  is  not  the  cus- 
tom of  this  country  to  conclude  treaties  of  surrender  with  any  na- 
tion-even with  those  whose  friendship  we  value  most — and  that  is 

42 

a custom  from  which  we  have  no  mind  to  depart". 

The  Davis  Amendment  was  passed  on  December  14,  by  the 

43 

large  majority  vote  of  65-17.  Then  followed  a flood  of  amend- 
ments, chief  among  them  in  importance  being  the  Bard  amendment: that 
"the  United  States  reserved  the  right  to  discriminate  charges  in 

traffic  in  favor  of  American  ships  engaged  in  coastwise  trade." 

44 

Like  many  of  the  other  amendments  it  was  rejected. 

This  attitude  of  the  Senate,  especially  the  passing  of  the 
Davis  amendment,  served  to  cool  off  the  relations  so  far  as  the  pub- 
lic was  concerned.  The  people  of  the  United  States  seemed  to  be  in 
a quandary,  but  at  the  same  time  they  were  growing  more  in  favor  of 
an  "American  canal";  and  although  they  felt  that  the  British  would 

reject  the  amendment,  there  seemed  to  be  a disposition  to  go  ahead 

45 

and  build  it  anyhow.  On  the  other  side  of  the  water,  the  English 

felt  that  they  had  gone  as  far  as  they  could  in  the  matter  of  con- 


42 

Editorial  in  The  Times,  Dec.  9,  1900. 

43 

News  article  in  The  New  York  Tribune,  Deo.  15,  1900. 

44 

Root's  Addresses,  221. 

45 

Editorial  in  The  New  York  Tribune , Dec.  14,  1900. 


. 


. 


-46- 


cessions.  They  based  their  opposition  to  the  fortifications  clause 

46 

to  its  being  at  variance  with  the  Convention  of  1850. 

What  were  the  elements  in  the  Senate  that  were  producing 

this  situation?  In  the  first  place,  there  were  the  jingoes  who 

wanted  an  American  canal  at  any  price  without  any  regard  to  foreign 

relations.  Then  there  was  the  opposition  of  the  trans -continental 

railroad  companies  and  those  Senators  interested  in  the  maintenance 

of  the  monopoly  of  the  Panama  railroad  in  collusion  with  the  Pacific 

Mail  Steamship  Company.  All  these  were  opposed  to  any  canal  at  all, 

but  at  the  same  time  under  cover  of  wanting  an  American  canal,  they 

indirectly  and  covertly  worked  for  the  passage  of  amendments  that 

would  be  so  offensive  to  Great  Britain  that  she  could  not  accept 

the  treaty;  consequently,  they  gambled  on  the  possibility  of  there 

being  no  canal  at  all.  And  last  among  the  elements  was  a disposi- 

tion--which  we  today  consider  almost  chronic — of  the  Senate  to  have 

47 

a hand  in  the  negotiations  of  the  treaty  itself. 

The  Senate,  after  making  two  more  amendments,  finally 

passed  the  treaty  on  December  20.  One  of  these  amendments  provided 

for  the  supers edure  of  the  Clayt on-Bulwer  Treaty;  the  other  struck 

out  entirely  the  clause  inviting  the  other  nations  to  adhere  to  the 
48 

treaty.  Senator  Lodge,  who  had  taken  the  lead  in  pushing  through 


46 

Editorial  in  The  Times,  Dec.  15,  1900. 

47 

Articles  in  The  Times  by  the  Washington  correspondent 
in  Nov.  and  Dec.,  1900. 

48 

Sen.  Doc . no.  474,  2nd  Sess.,  63rd  Cong.,  289-291. 


T' ! 


* 


. 


-47- 


the  treaty  as  amended,  explained  the  Senate  action:  "Let  me  say, 

first,  that  the  amendments  were  not  dictated  hy  hostility  towards 

England,  and  still  less  in  any  degree  a reflection  on  the  Secretary 

of  State....  The  amendments  were  made  hy  the  Senate  solely  because 

in  its  opinion  they  were  necessary  for  the  interests  of  the  United 

States,  for  the  avoidance  of  any  question  as  to  the  control  of  the 

canal,  and  consequently  for  the  sake  of  peaceful  and  harmonious 

relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world  on  that  subject  in  the  future. 

In  the  exercise  of  its  undoubted  rights,  without  the  slightest 

reflection  upon  anyone  and  without  a shadow  of  hostility  to  a friend 

ly  nation,  the  Senate.*  c anti nuing  the  negotiations  of  Mr.  Hay,  offers 

49 

three  new  propositions  to  England”. 

The  British  dissatisfaction  at  the  action  of  the  Senate 
was  painfully  evident.  Even  the  most  ul tr a -American  journals  were 
dismayed;  for  instance,  the  Spectator  said:  "The  action  of  the 
United  States  Senate  during  the  past  week  has  been  anything  but  cal- 
culated to  raise  that  body  in  the  opinion  of  serious  people.  It  has 
not  only  treated  a diplomatic  instrument  of  great  importance  in 
itself  and  prepared  by  one  of  the  ablest  and  most  patriotic  of 
American  statesmen  as  if  it  were  the  work  of  the  merest  ignoramus  in 
foreign  affairs,  but  it  has  tolerated  a levity  and  recklessness  of 
tone  in  regard  to  solemn  treaty  obligations  which  shows  that  the 

Senate  as  a body  is  losing  its  sense  of  the  high  responsibility  with 

50 

which  it  is  entrusted  under  the  constitution."  lodge  and  the 

49 

News  article  in  The  New  York  Tribune,  Dec.  21,  1900. 

50 

"Topics  of  the  Day"  in  The  Spectator , Dec.  22,  1900. 


. 

■ 

• 

-48- 

President  were  attacked  for  their  stand:  the  former  because  he  had 
opposed  the  treaty  in  the  Senate,  and  the  latter  because  he  had 
vacillated.  In  their  opinion  he  should  have  withdrawn  the  treaty. 
What  seemed  to  provoke  The  Times  was  the  abrogation  of  the  Glayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty  without  any  conference  with  Great  Britain:  "We  cannot 
imagine  a nation  whose  greatness  and  prosperity  are  based  in  no 
small  measure  the  inviolability  of  ordinary  civil  contracts,  should 
seriously  contemplate  the  one-sided  rescission  of  an  agreement  in- 

51 

vested  with  special  sanctity  by  the  law  of  all  civilized  nations". 
The  Saturday  Review  had  predicted  such  action;  and  in  this  case, 
it  spoke  of  the  Senate's  action  as  being  "an  inlovely  spectacle 
which  the  Senate  and  President  are  at  present  affording  the  civi- 
lized world....  The  worst  of  it  is  that  we  have  only  ourselves  to 
blame  for  the  whole  pother.  The  policy  of  perpetual  concession  to 
the  United  States,  and  the  overstrained  eulogism  of  her  statesmen, 
meets  with  no  response  from  the  other  party  save  fresh  demands  and 
increasing  insolence.  The  conviction  that  we  shall  on  no  possible 
grounds  quarrel  with  them  has  become  so  ingrained  in  American 
politicians,  and  has  been  so  carefully  fostered  by  our  courting  of 

their  good  will,  that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  convince  them  that 

52 

they  are  wrong".  By  January  they  exhibited  a tendency  to  calm 
down  and  yield  to  the  Senate.  The  death  of  Queen  Victoria  in  that 

51 

Editorial  in  The  Times,  Dec.  24,  1900. 

52 

Editorial  on  "The  Nicaraguan  Scandal"  in  the  Saturday 
Review,  Dec.  22,  1900. 


-49- 


month  and  the  American  sympathy  with  the  English  public  served  to 

53 

stabilize  good  relations  once  more. 

Mr.  Hay  presented  the  amended  treaty  to  Lord  Lansdowne, 

who  was  the  new  Foreign  Secretary.  He  was  anxious  for  the  British 

to  act  favorably  because  he  despaired  of  ever  getting  another  treaty 

54 

through  the  Senate.  But  the  treaty  was  still  unratified  on  March 
4,  which  was  the  last  day  allowed  by  the  terms,  and  it  died  a 
natural  death. 

The  Americans  felt  that  this  policy  on  the  part  of  England  - 
55 

was  wise.  It  afforded  the  Senate,  however,  an  excellent  oppor- 
tunity to  attack  British  policy.  Senator  Morgan  took  the  lead  in 

this  assault  in  the  fight  for  his  resolution  declaring  the  Clayton- 

56 

Bulwer  treaty  void.  For  the  Senate  to  have  passed  such  a resolu- 
tion would  have  set  a bad  precedent,  but  it  seemed  that  the  Senate 
was  not  worrying  about  precedents — it  wanted  a canal. 

Nevertheless,  the  British  Foreign  Office  had  made  a reply. 
Although  it  was  written  on  the  22nd  of  February,  it  was  not  pre- 
sented to  the  State  Department  until  the  11th  of  March.  England's 
opposition  to  the  Senate's  amendments  was  as  follows:  as  to  the 


53 

The  British  reciprocated  this  sympathy  a few  months 
later  when  McKinley  was  killed.  Thus,  it  took  the  deaths  of  two 
good  rulers  to  steady  the  international  relations. 

54 

Hay  to  Choate,  Jan.  25,  1901.  Sen.  Doc . no.  474,  op. 

cit . , 10. 

55 

Editorial  in  The  N ew  York  Tribune,  May  6,  1901. 

56 

Cong.  Record,  1st  Sess.,  57th  Cong.,  1378  ff. 


-50- 

superseding  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  the  British  still  regarded 
it  as  a valid  and  international  contract  that  should  not  have  “been 
abrogated  unless  both  parties  had  been  consulted;  besides,  abroga- 
tion would  mean  a scramble  for  territory  in  Central  America,  since 
both  parties  would  be  exempted  from  the  prohibitions  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty.  In  regard  to  the  Davis  amendment.  Lord  Lansdowne 
held  that  since  the  United  States  was  not  the  owner  of  the  territory 
through  which  the  canal  would  pass,  that  fact  would  not  permit  it  to 
fortify  the  canal;  in  addition,  should  the  United  States  get  into 
war  with  Great  Britain,  the  United  States  would  have  rights  in  the 
canal  that  Great  Britain  would  be  denied.  In  other  words,  he  re- 
garded this  provision  as  being  one-sided,  and  the  ’’general  principle 
of  neutralization”  would  be  subverted.  Lastly,  he  opposed  the 
elision  of  the  invitation  clause  for  he  felt  that  such  co-operation 
was  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  the  neutrality  of  the  canal; 
but  his  strongest  point  was  that  in  case  of  a general  war,  Great 
Britain,  in  spite  of  her  great  colonial  interests,  would  be  bound 
by  the  treaty  and  the  other  nations  would  have  a great  advantage 
over  her  by  not  being  so  bound.  He  preferred  the  <31  ayton-Bulwer 

Treaty  as  it  was,  but  His  Majesty’s  Government  "would  sincerely  re- 

57 

gret  a failure  to  come  to  an  amicable  understanding”. 

On  the  whole,  the  American  public  opinion  was  kindly  dis- 

57 

Landsdowne  to  Pauncefote,  Feb.  ££,  1901.  Sen.  Doc., 
no.  474,  11-17;  Parliamentary  Papers , no.  1,  1901,  XCI,  3 ff . ; 

State  Papers . XClY,  476,484. 


-51- 


posed  towards  Landsdowne's  reply,  especially  in  view  of  its  friendly 

and  courteous  tone.  It  was  felt  that  this  was  a favorable  beginning 

58 

of  an  amicable  settlement.  Although  there  were  discordant  indi- 
viduals here  and  there  that  were  clamoring  for  the  immediate  abroga- 

59 

tion  of  the  treaty  by  act  of  Congress,  fortunately,  the  element 

of  serious -minded  people  was  strong  enough  to  prevent  any  such  ac- 
tion. 

But  strangely  enough,  the  English  were  now  more  determined 
than  ever  to  stand  by  their  rights  as  they  saw  them.  They  felt  a 
pride  in  the  kindly  but  firm  reply.  As  in  the  case  of  the  note, 
they  showed  no  inclination  to  close  the  doors  to  further  negotia- 
tions, if  only  the  Senate  would  reciprocate  their  good  will.  Never- 
theless, they  showed  no  willingness  to  initiate  the  negotiations, 

60 

the  Senate  seeming  to  be  a sort  of  a "bugaboo”  to  any  undertaking. 

Thus,  efforts  to  arrive  at  a settlement  by  means  of  the 
"First  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty"  had  failed  for  the  moment.  It  was  a 
fortunate  day  for  America  that  the  Senate  was  made  up  of  the  ele- 
ments that  it  was;  for  after  all,  they  made  possible  a more 
"American  canal",  at  least  more  so  than  was  thought  possible  at 
the  time. 


58 

"The  March,  of  Events"  in  The  Worlds  Work,  May  1901. 

59 

Editorial  in  The  Chicago  Tribune,  Mar.  13,  1901. 

60 

Editorials  in  The  Times,  Mar.  12  and  Mar.  26,  1901; 
editorial  in  the  Saturday  Review,  Mar.  30,  1901;  "Topics  of  the 
Day"  in  The  Spectator,  May  11,  1901. 


-52- 

CHAPTER  IV 

THE  SECOND  AND  PINAL  HAY-PAUNCEPOTE  TREATY 

Taking  his  cue  from  the  hint  near  the  close  of  the  reply 
from  Lord  Landsdowne , Secretary  Hay  immediately  set  to  work  to  per- 
fect another  treaty.  But  this  time  he  used  rare  tact  and  showed  his 
deference  to  the  Senate,  for  he  called  some  of  the  leading  Senators 
into  his  confidence  and  got  their  sentiments  before  he  began  to 
negotiate  with  Lord  Pauncefote.1  Senator  Lodge  assured  him  that  he 
believed  a treaty  would  pass  the  Senate  that  provided  for  the  abro- 
gation of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty;  that  would  allow  the  United 
States  to  fortify  the  canal  if  it  chose  to  do  so;  and  that  would  be 
free  and  open  to  all  nations  at  equal  rates  with  the  United  States.2 

The  consequence  was  the  first  draft  of  the  new  treaty, 
completed  on  April  25,  1901.  The  preamble  was  much  the  same  as  that 
of  the  other  treaty.  In  fact,  it  was  very  similar  to  the  other 
treaty  with  the  following  exceptions.  Firstly,  the  abrogation  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  was  provided  for  in  a separate  article. 
Secondly,  the  United  States,  not  the  high  contracting  parties,  agreed 
to  adopt  rules  to  carry  out  the  "general  principle,"  thus  doing  away 
with  the  joint  guarantee  of  the  first  treaty.  Thirdly,  there  is  no 
mention  of  any  fortifications.  Fourthly,  the  phrase  "in  time  of 

1 

Hay  to  Choate,  Apr.  27,  1901.  Sen.  Doc..,  no,  474,  2nd 
Sess.  63rd  Cong.,  21-22. 

2 

Lodge  to  Hay,  Mar.  28,  1901.  Thayer,  John  Hay.  II,  260. 


-53- 


peace  as  in  war”  was  omitted,  thus  obviating  the  objections  of  the 
Senate  that  the  canal  would  be  open  to  an  enemy's  vessels  in  time 
of  war  when  this  phrase  was  retained.  Lastly,  there  was  the  omis- 
sion of  the  clause  inviting  the  other  nations  to  adhere  to  the  same 

rz 

rules.  Thus,  Hay  had  yielded  entirely  to  the  Senate  and  had  striven 
for  a treaty  just  as  the  Senate  had  passed  the  former  one  with  the 
amendments  added.  And  it  was  this  same  fear  of  the  Senate  that 
pursued  the  whole  course  of  the  negotiations  for  the  final  treaty. 

It  may  be  that  the  presence  of  Senator  Lodge  in  England  in  June 
caused  the  British  Foreign  Office  to  see  the  light,  for  while  lunch- 
ing at  one  time  with  Balfour  and  Landsdowne  he  gave  them  some  very 
straight  talk  that  showed  them  at  least  the  senatorial  view  of  the 
matter3 4 5--and  that  was  of  no  small  consequence. 

Lord  Landsdowne  made  his  reply  on  August  3.  He  was  dis- 
posed in  no  way  to  yield  his  former  position;  however,  he  had  no 
objections  to  the  United  States  being  the  sole  guarantor  of  the 

c 

canal.  Nor  was  he  opposed  to  the  abrogation  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Convention;  but  on  the  other  hand,  he  wanted  some  portions  of  it 
retained,  so  he  proposed  the  following  article  which  he  called 
"III-A:"  "In  view  of  the  permanent  character  of  this  treaty  whereby 
the  general  principle  established  by  Article  VIII  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  convention  is  reaffirmed,  the  high  contracting  parties  hereby 

3 

Sen.  Doc. . no.  474,  20-21. 

4 

Choate  to  Hay,  June  24,  1901.  Ibid . . 24. 

5 

Memorandum  in  letter  from  Landsdowne  to  Lowther.  Aug.  3. 
1901.  Ibid. . 27. 


- 


i 


■ * ■ ■ ■ 


-- 


- ' 


■ 


: 


__ 

, 

. 


; 


. 


■ 

: •• 


-54- 

declare  and  agree  that  the  rules  laid  down  in  the  preceding  article 
shall,  so  far  as  they  may  be  applicable  govern  all  intercoeanic 
communications  across  the  isthmus  which  connects  North  and  South 
America,  and  that  no  change  of  territorial  sovereignty  or  other  cir- 
cumstances shall  effect  such  general  principle  or  the  obligations  of 

£ 

the  high  contracting  parties  under  the  present  treaty".  Neither  did 
he  have  any  objection  to  the  omission  of  any  clause  regarding  forti- 
fications, as  he  understood  that  the  United  States  reserved  that 

right  and  that  circumstances  might  arise  when  the  United  States  would 

7 

find  it  necessary  to  fortify  the  route.  One  of  the  most  impor- 
tant additions  that  he  requested  was  the  insertion  of  the  clause 

"which  shall  agree  to  observe  these  rules"  after  "all  nations"  in 

0 

Article  III,  section  1.  This  amounted  to  an  invitation  to  other 
nations  to  enter  into  treaty  stipulations,  otherwise  from  the  British 
point  of  view,  Great  Britain  would  be  in  an  unfair  position  in  time 
of  war.  This  was  substantially  the  same  argument  that  had  been  used 
by  Lord  Landsdowne  before.  Another  addition  that  he  wanted,  so  that 
there  might  be  some  mention  of  the  terms  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  was  the  addition  in  Article  III,  section  1,  of  the  clause 

g 

"such  conditions  and  charges  shall  be  just  and  equitable".*  There  is 
6 

Memorandum  in  letter  from  Landsdowne  to  Lowther,  Aug.  3, 
1901.  Sen.  Doc. . no.  474,  28. 

7 

Ibid. 

8 

Ibid.,  29. 

9 

Ibid. 


. 


-55- 

no  doubt  that  Landsdowne  was  sincere  and  was  very  hopeful  of  success, 
Choate  immediately  opposed  some  of  the  additions  that  had 
been  suggested.  He  saw  that  the  proposed  III-A  was  too  strongly 
flavored  with  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  which  was  the  very  thing 
that  the  Senate  was  wanting  to  get  rid  of;  consequently,  the  Senate 
would  never  pass  it.  He  was  also  irritated  at  the  persistence  of 
the  British  in  "lugging  in  the  other  nations"  by  virtue  of  the  clause 
providing  for  the  invitation  to  other  nations;  and  as  a means  to 
offset  the  proposition--for  he  knew  that  the  Senate  would  be  sure  to 
kill  such  an  addition,  he  suggested  that  the  sentence  under  discussior 
would  read:  "The  canal  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of 

commerce  and  war  of  all  nations  observing  these  rules". ^ 

The  cause  for  the  persistency  of  Landsdowne  was  largely 
political.  The  ministry  was  afraid  that  if  there  was  not  some  de- 
finite retention  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  so  as  to  force  the 
United  States  to  maintain  the  "general  principle"  the  people  would 
not  sustain  it.  In  other  words,  that  was  the  concession  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  that  the  public  wanted  in  return  for  the  abro- 
gation. This  seemed  too  much  to  Choate,  especially  the  fastening  of 
III-A  upon  the  United  States  in  perpetuum.-^ 

A pleasant  feature  of  the  whole  negotiations  was  the  trust 
that  Hay  and  the  President  had  in  Choate.  Invariably,  they  concurred 

10 

Choate  to  Hay,  Aug.  16,  1901.  Sen.  Doc.,  no.  474,  32. 

11 

Choate  to  Hay,  Aug.  20,  1901.  Ibid . . 35. 


' 


. 


, 


-56- 

wit  h him  and  were  influenzed  by  his  judgment.  This  was  evident  when 

Hay  wrote  to  Lord  Pauncefote  on  September  2.  In  this  letter,  he 

tactfully  informed  him  that  one  thing  must  always  be  kept  in  mind; 

12 

namely  the  power  of  the  Senate  minority  in  dealing  with  a treaty. 

Hay  repeated  the  very  arguments  of  Choate  in  regards  to  the  addi- 
tions of  Landsdovme . Was  Hay  using  the  Senate  as  a club?  Anyway, 
he  submitted  the  following  substitute  as  Article  IV  for  III -A: "It  is 
agreed  that  no  change  of  territorial  sovereignty  or  of  the  inter- 
national relations  of  the  country  traversed  by  the  before  mentioned 
canal  shall  affect  the  general  principle  of  neutralization  of  the 
obligations  of  the  high  contracting  parties  under  the  present 
treaty". This  immediately  met  the  approval  of  Lord  Landsdowne 
Early  in  September  Lord  Landsdowne  went  away  to  Ireland 
for  a vacation.  Lord  Pauncefote  had  returned  to  London.  There  he 
continued  the  negotiations  with  Mr.  Choate,  and  the  two  together 
served  to  put  the  finishing  touches,  so  to  speak,  on  the  treaty. 

Lord  Pauncefote  was  more  worried  about  pleasing  the  public 
than  the  Foreign  Secretary  had  apparently  been.  Choate  maintained 
that  equality  of  terms  was  included  in  the  words  "general  principle" 
but  Pauncefote  feared  that  a different  interpretation  might  be 
placed  upon  these  same  words  so  as  to  discriminate  against  Creat 
Britain,  and  he  insisted  upon  something  explicit.  ^ This  detailed 

12 

Hay  to  Pauncefote,  Sept.  2,  1901.  Sen.  Doc.,  no.  474, 
2nd  Sess.  63rd  Cong.,  37. 

13 

Ibid.  38. 

14  * 

Landsdowne  to  Lowther,  Sept.  12,  1901.  Ibid.,  39. 

15 

Choate  to  Hay,  Sept.  21,  1901.  Ibid. . 40-42. 


' 

. 


-57- 


phraseology  was  the  one  thing  that  Choate  feared  most,  because  any 
such  addition  only  served  to  give  the  Senate  a better  opportunity 
to  defeat  the  treaty.  He  suggested,  then,  an  addition  to  Hay’s 
substitute  which  satisfied  Lord  Pauncefote.  This  provided  for  the 
"freedom  of  passage  of  the  canal  to  the  vessels  of  commerce  and  of 
war  of  all  nations  on  terms  of  entire  equality".16  It  was  at  this 
time  that  Mr.  Choate  was  somewhat  irritated  at  Lord  Pauncefote, 
speaking  of  him  as  being  a "good  deal  governed  by  the  old  English 
maxim  of  never  giving  anything  for  nothing”.17  At  this  moment  in 
the  game,  Choate  again  showed  his  good  common  sense  and  advised  the 
State  Department  to  allow  Senator  Lodge  to  see  the  treaty  and  get 
his  advice,  the  Senator  being  yet  in  London.18  Immediately,  the 
Department  gave  him  permission.  This  was  a very  wise  course,  indeed. 

Mr.  Hay  and  the  President  approved  of  the  addition  although 


they  regarded  it  as  unnecessary 


19 


Hay  was  very  optimistic  at  this 


point  and  regarded  the  treaty  as  oractically  settled;  but  Choate 

was  not  so  sure,  for  he  knew  the  task  that  he  had  of  satisfying 

20 

Lord  Pauncefote. 

On  the  26th  of  September  occurred  an  incident  almost  dram- 
atic. A few  days  prior  to  this,  Lord  Pauncefote  had  granted  that 


16 

Choate  to  Hay,  Sept.  20,  1901.  Sen.  Doc.,  no.  474, 
2nd  Sess.  63rd  Cong.,  40. 

17 

Choate  to  Hay,  Sept.  25,  1901.  Ibid . . 43. 

18 

Ibid. 

19 


20 


Hay  to  Choate,  Sept.  21,  1901.  Ibid . . 42. 

) 

Choate  to  Hay,  Sept.  25,  1901.  Ibid. 


-58- 

the  treaty  only  referred  to  the  Nicaragua  route  nor  did  he  feel  that 
reference  to  another  canal  was  necessary,  since  the  United  States 
already  had  treaties  with  other  countries  that  insured  the  "general 
principle."  But  on  the  day  mentioned,  he  hurried  to  the  American 
embassy,  and  in  a very  perturbed  state  of  mind  told  the  ambassador 
that  he  had  been  mistaken;  that  an  article  in  The  Times  had  led  him 
to  see  that  the  United  States  had  no  such  treaties  as  he  had  sup- 
posed; besides,  he  had  heard  news  that  led  him  to  think  that  the 
United  States  would  not  use  the  Nicaraguan  route,  but  would  use  the 
Panama  route  instead.  In  such  a case,  Creat  Britain  would  be  placed 
in  the  ridiculous  position  of  having  signed  a treaty  abrogating  the 

Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  that  had  no  reference  to  the  canal  the  United 

22 

States  actually  was  contemplating. 

Choate  tried  to  reassure  Lord  Pauncefote  by  emphasizing 

what  he  knew  was  Hay’s  opinion;  namely,  that  the  treaty  applied  to 

all  routes.  Cablegrams  from  Hay  confirmed  Choate’s  opinion,  and 

23 

Roosevelt  seconded  Hay’s  opinion.  In  the  face  of  all  this,  Paunce' 

fote  was  not  to  be  satisfied,  for  he  feared  a repetition  of  the 

Blaine  episode;  namely,  a declaration  that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty 

24 

referred  only  to  the  Nicaragua  route.  Pauncefote  was  determined 

El 

Choate  to  Hay,  Sept.  El,  1901.  Sen.  Doc . . No.  474, 

End  Sess.  63rd  Cong. , 41. 

£2 

Choate  to  Hay,  Sept.  27,  1901.  Ibid. . 44. 

E3 

Hay  to  Choate,  Sept.  E9,  1901,  and  Oct.  E,  1091. 

Ibid.,  45. 

E4 

Choate  to  Hay,  Oct.  E,  1901.  Ibid . . 47. 


-59- 

that  there  would  be  room  for  no  such  stand  this  time,  and  insisted 
upon  adding  "by  whatever  route  may  be  decided  expedient"  after  the 
words  "Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans"  in  the  preamble.2^  Strange  to 
say,  Senator  Lodge  thoroughly  approved  of  this  amendment,  consider- 
ing it  an  improvement.^6 

Landsdowne  returned  about  the  first  of  October,  and  ex- 
pressed his  satisfaction  with  the  treaty.  His  attitude  throughout 
had  been  commendable  and  Choate  in  expressing  appreciation  of 
his  friendly  attitude  said  of  him:  "He  has  shown  an  earnest  desire 

to  bring  to  an  amicable  settlement  honorable  alike  to  both  parties, 
this  long  and  important  controversy  between  the  two  nations.  In 
substance,  he  abrogates  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  gives  us  an  Amer- 
ican canal  on  the  sole  condition  of  its  being  always  neutral  and  free 
for  the  passage  of  the  ships  of  all  nations  on  equal  terms,  except 

that,  if  we  get  into  a war  with  any  nation,  we  can  shut  its  ships 

27 

out  and  take  care  of  ourselves". 

The  United  States  approved  all  the  amendments  as  early  as 
28 

October  3;  but  the  delay  was  due  to  the  British  officials  not  hav- 

29 

ing  returned  from  their  vacations.  One  more  change  was  made,  how- 
ever, and  that  was  the  voluntary  elision  by  Lord  Landsdowne  of  the 

25 

Choate  to  Hay,  Oct.  2,  1901.  Sen.  Doc . . No.  474, 

2nd  Sess.  63rd  Cong.,  46. 

26 

Ibid. 

27 

Ibid.,  48. 

28 

Hay  to  Choate,  Oct.  3,  1901.  Ibid . . 48. 

29 

Choate  to  Hay,  Oct.  9,  1901.  Ibid. 


-60 


addition  to  HayTs  substitute  that  Pauncefote  had  insisted  upon. 

This  change  was  made  also  for  the  reason  that  the  detailed  wording 

rzn 

of  it  would  cause  much  trouble  in  the  Senate. 

By  this  time  reports  were  beginning  to  leak  out  that  a 

treaty  had  been  made.  Its  terras  were  not  yet  known;  but  in  England 

there  was  much  anticipated  satisfaction,  because  if  Lord  Pauncefote 

had  agreed  to  it,  it  was  all  right.  The  fear  of  the  Senate  was  not 

31 

entirely  absent,  however,  and  there  was  considerable  anxiety. 

After  minor  changes  were  made  the  treaty  was  signed  in 
Washington  on  November  18,  1901.  In  brief  its  terms  were  as 
follows:  in  the  preamble  the  terms  of  the  treaty  were  stated  to 

apply  to  whatever  route  might  be  considered.  The  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty  was  superseded.  The  United  States  was  to  have  the  right  to 
construct,  manage,  and  regulate  the  canal.  It  was  the  third  article 
that  has  excited  the  most  controversy.  One  part  of  this  provided 
that  "The  canal  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of  commerce 
of  of  war  of  all  nations  observing  these  rules,  on  terms  of  entire 
equality,  so  that  there  shall  be  no  discrimination  against  any  such 
nation,  or  its  citizens  or  subjects,  in  respect  of  the  conditions  of 
traffic  or  otherwise.  Such  conditions  and  charges  of  traffic  shall 
be  just  and  equitable."  (This  is  the  well-known  first  section  of 
Article  III.)  Then  there  were  the  provisions  regarding  the  use  of 
the  canal  by  belligerent  nations,  all  of  which  rules  were  based  upon 

30 

White  to  Hay,  Oct.  23,  1901.  Sen.  Doc. . No.  474, 

2nd  Sess.  63rd  Cong..  50:  White  to  Hay.  Oct.  26.  1901.  Ibid..  51. 

31 

Editorial  in  The  Times,  Nov.  19,  1901. 


-61- 


the  Treaty  of  Constantinople,  the  treaty  that  defined  international 
rights  in  the  Suez  Canal,  Lastly,  there  was  an  article  that  provid- 
ed that  no  change  of  territorial  sovereignty  of  the  lands  traversed 
by  the  canal  were  to  affect  the  "general  principle  of  neutraliza- 
tion."32 

President  Roosevelt  laid  the  treaty  before  the  Senate  in 

his  message  on  the  3rd  of  December,  and  he  urged  the  ratification 

of  it  as  guaranteeing  to  the  United  States  everything  that  it  had 

ever  asked.  So  without  much  ado,  the  treaty  passed  the  Senate  by 

the  overwhelming  vote  of  7E-6,  on  December  16. 33 

No  one  was  more  elated  than  Hay,  who  felt  that  his  great 

object  had  been  attained,  and  he  modestly  gave  the  credit  to  the 

President  and  to  Senator  Lodge  for  the  success  of  the  ratification.3^ 

The  public  of  the  United  States  was  highly  pleased,  as  was 

the  English.  All  united  in  bestowing  the  chief  credit  to  Mr.  Hay 

35 

and  Lord  Pauncefote.  The  outflowing  of  friendship  for  the  United 

*36 

States  was  nowhere  greater  than  in  Parliament.  There  was  one  dis- 
cordant but  prophetic  voice  raised  amid  all  this  international  hap- 
piness and  that  was  the  Saturday  Review.  It  regarded  the  result  as 
no  more  than  could  be  expected  from  a nation  that  was  never  asleep 


32 

Malloy,  Treaties . I,  782-784.  Cf.  Statutes  at  Large . 
XXXII,  part  2,  1903-1905. 

33 

Cong.  Record,  part  1.  1st  Sess.,  57th  Cong.,  318. 

34 

Hay  to  White,  Dec.  26,  1901.  Thayer,  John  Hay.  II,  261. 

35 

Editorial  in  The  New  York  Tribune . Dec.  17,  1901; 
editorial  in  The  Chicago  Tribune . Dec.  17,  190}.;  "Topics  of  the  Day" 
in  The  Spectator.  Dec.  21,  1901;  editorial  in  The  Times . Dec.  17,1901. 
3b 

Parliamentary  Debates . 4th  series,  CL,  1902,  9-20. 


-62- 

to  its  own  advantage,  and  it  voiced  the  prediction  that  since  the 
United  States  now  had  the  absolute  control  of  the  canal,  the  civi- 
lized world  might  be  made  to  feel  the  effects  of  any  irritability 

37 

with  which  the  Government  may  be  affected  from  time  to  time. 

The  conclusion  to  this  chapter  may  best  be  summed  up  in  an 
editorial  taken  from  The  Times  in  its  comments  upon  the  ratification 
of  the  treaty  by  the  United  States  Senate:  "Seldom,  if  ever,  has  an 

international  question  been  approached  with  more  unreserved  willing- 
ness than  British  diplomacy  has  shown  on  this  occasion  to  concede 
everything  except  essential  and  practical  interests  to  the  altered 
wishes  and  expanded  aspirations  of  a friendly  nation.  We  have  met 
the  views  of  the  United  States  government  at  every  step  and  in  every 
way,  short  of  surrendering  the  equality  of  trading  rights  and  the 
privileges  of  neutrality,  which  we,  like  all  commercial  nations, 
have  felt  bound  to  claim.  Above  all,  the  services  rendered  by 
Secretary  Hay  and  Lord  Pauncefote,  and  in  this  country  of  Lord  Lands- 
downe,  should  never  be  forgotten  by  those  who  wish  to  see  the  Britist 
nation  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  drawn  together  by  the 
ties  of  amity  and  concord".00 

37 

Editorial  in  The  Saturday  Review.  Dec.  21,  1901. 

38 

Editorial  in  The  Times . Dec.  17,  1901. 


: 


. 


• ... 


" 


ol  r ' - 

■ 


. 


■ 


: 


, 


'■ 


. 

. 


. 


. , 


* 


X 


-63- 

CHAPTER  V 

THE  TOLLS  CONTROVERSY 

Soon  after  the  settlement  with  Great  Britain  had  been 
made,  the  United  States  began  to  take  steps  to  carry  out  the  purpose 
of  the  convention;  namely,  the  construction  of  a canal  across  the 
isthmus.  After  a report  of  another  canal  commission,  which  this  time 
decided  in  favor  of  the  Panama  route,  Congress  passed  the  Spooner 
bill  which  became  a law  in  June,  1902.  This  Act  authorized  the 
President  to  purchase  the  property  and  the  rights  of  the  French 
Canal  Company,  and  to  negotiate  a treaty  with  Colombia  to  obtain  the 
right  of  way  for  the  canal. ^ 

Accordingly,  the  Hay-Herran  treaty  was  negotiated,  but  the 

p 

Colombian  government  refused  to  ratify.  Then  followed  the  sudden 
revolt  in  Panama  against  the  Colombian  government  which  was  as  sud- 
denly followed  by  the  recognition  of  Panama's  independence  by  the 
United  States  in  November,  1903. 3 The  United  States  quickly  nego- 
tiated and  concluded  a treaty  with  Panama  that  made  the  United  States 

4 

the  owners  of  a strip  of  land  across  Panama.  Thus  President  Roose- 
velt "took  the  isthmus”  for  the  benefit  of  mankind. 

During  all  this  time  the  relations  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  were  most  friendly,  especially  during  the  second 
administration  of  President  Roosevelt.  This  was  largely  due  to  the 

1 

Statutes  at  Large.  XXXII,  part  1,  481-484. 

2“ 

Beaupre  to  Hay,  Oct.  17,  1903.  Sen.  Doc.  No.  474,  2nd 
Sess.  63rd  Cong. , 462.  See  the  inclosure  in  the  letter  quoted, 
ibid.,  459-462. 

3 

Hay  to  Beaupre,  Nov.  18,  1903.  Ibid.,  479. 

4Malloy,  Treaties.  II.  1349-1357.  Cf.  Statutes  at  Large . 

aagi-QB4il  


-64- 

efforts  of  Elihu  Root,  American  Secretary  of  State,  and  Viscount 

Bryce,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Washington.  The  Alaskan  boundary 

dispute  had  already  been  settled  by  Mr.  Hay.  In  1908  the  way  was 

paved  towards  the  state  of  mind  of  the  two  countries  that  should  have 

served  to  settle  all  questions  at  issue  between  the  two  great  nations 

This  was  the  arbitration  treaty  drawn  up  by  Mr.  Root  and  Viscount 

Bryce.  It  provided  among  other  things  that  in  case  of  dispute  over 

the  interpretation  of  a treaty,  the  question  should  be  submitted  to 

5 

the  Hague  Tribunal  for  settlement. 

There  was  only  one  incident  during  this  period  that  por- 
tended dangerous  consequences  for  the  future.  At  least,  it  showed 
that  Great  Britain  was  thoroughly  awake  to  what  she  considered  her 
own  interests.  In  the  draft  of  the  treaties  negotiated  between  the 
United  States  and  Colombia  and  the  United  States  and  Panama  there 

was  a provision  that  Colombian  war  vessels  were  to  be  allowed  transit 

£ 

through  the  canal  without  the  payment  of  tolls.  When  this  fact  was 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  British  Foreign  Office,  it  immediate- 
ly threatened  to  protest  on  the  ground  that  this  clause  was  a viola- 

7 

tion  of  Sec.  1,  Article  III,  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty.  Earl 
Grey,  who  at  that  time  was  the  British  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
was  absent  at  the  time,  but  Under-Secretary  Hardinge  evidently  had 

5 

Malloy,  Treaties , II,  1349-1357.  Cf.  Statutes  at  Large. 
XXXIII,  814-815. 

6 

Sen.  Doc. . No.  474,  op.  cit.,  180. 

7 

Reid  to  Root,  Jan.  11,  1909.  Ibid . . 71. 


-65- 

re  garde  d this  as  an  opportune  time  to  play  a hig  part.  The  State 
Department  considered  that  the  treaty  was  necessary  to  secure  our 
rights  in  the  canal  zone;  that  it  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  ques- 
tion of  tolls;  and  that  the  purpose  of  the  treaty  was  really  to  carry 
out  the  purpose  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty,  not  to  violate  it. 

Neither  was  there  any  pretense  or  subterfuge  to  make  the  discrimina- 

8 

tion  a matter  of  precedent*  It  was  not  long,  however,  till  the 

under-secretary  showed  no  intentions  to  haggle  over  the  affair  and 

withdrew  his  threatening  disposition  when  he  saw  that  the  United 

St&tes  assured  His  Majesty* s Government  that  the  exemption  of 

9 

Colombia  would  not  be  considered  a precedent.  And  the  matter  was 
dropped.  Colombia  failed  to  act  upon  the  treaty  and  nothing  came 
of  the  affair  except  to  show  that  Great  Britain  would  watch  care- 
fully any  interpretation  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty.8 9 10 

The  year  1910  marked  the  settlement  of  practically  all 
existing  difficulties  with  Great  Britain.  But  these  good  relations 
were  not  long  to  continue.  The  time  was  now  close  at  hand  for  the 
opening  of  the  canal-«and  incidentally,  a presidential  election. 

Plans  must  be  laid  by  the  politicians. 

On  December  11,  1911,  President  Taft  sent  a special  mes- 
sage to  Congress  that  was  not  only  a harbinger  of  evil  tidings  to 
British  commerce,  but  also  to  all  who  wished  to  keep  the  two  nations 

8 

Root  to  Bryce,  Jan.  16,  1909.  Sen.  Doc. . no.  474, 

End  Sess.  63rd  Cong.,  74-74. 

9 

Memorandum  from  British  Ambassador,  Feb.  3,  1909. 

Ibid.,  76-77. 

10 

Inclosure  in  letter — Northcote  to  knox,  Oct.  EO,  1909. 
Ibid. , E48-E49. 


-66- 

on  the  friendliest  of  terms  and  who  sought  for  an  era  where  nations 
should  keep  both  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of  treaties.  He  asked 
Congress  to  pass  an  act  to  provide  for  the  regulation,  maintenance, 
and  control  of  the  canal,  and  to  authorize  the  President  to  fix  tolls 
for  the  benefit  of  American  shipping.  This  message  was  the  first 
official  statement  made  in  the  United  States  upholding  the  right  of 
the  United  States  to  deal  with  the  canal  as  it  saw  fit,  thus  strain- 
ing the  interpretation  of  the  Hay  Pauncefote  Treaty.  Said  President 
Taft:  "I  am  very  confident  that  the  United  States  has  the  power  to 

relieve  from  the  payment  of  tolls  any  part  of  our  shipping  that  Con- 
gress deems  wise.  We  own  the  canal.  It  was  our  money  that  built  it. 
We  have  the  right  to  charge  tolls  for  its  use.  Those  tolls  must  be 
the  same  to  every  one;  but  when  we  are  dealing  with  our  own  ships, 
the  practice  of  many  Governments  of  subsidizing  their  own  merchant 
vessels  is  so  well  established  in  general  that  a subsidy  equal  to  the 
tolls,  an  equivalent  remission  of  tolls,  can  not  be  held  to  be  a dis- 
crimination in  the  use  of  the  canal".1'*' 

In  June,  1912,  the  Senate  Committee  on  Interoceanic  Canals 
reported  favorably  a bill  providing  for  the  opening,  maintenance, 
protection  and  operation  of  the  Panama  canal,  and  the  sanitation  and 
government  of  the  Canal  Zone.  One  provision  of  the  bill  was  that 
relating  to  American  shipping,  wherein  all  American  shipping  was  to 

11 

Foreign  Relations  1912,  467-469. 


i' 


■ 

. 

- 


- 


. 


. 


1 ■ 


- 


. 


. 


. 


f 


r 


-67- 

1 2 

be  granted  free  transit  through  the  canal.  Unusual  blustery  debate 
was  not  long  getting  under  way  and  that  manner  was  maintained 
throughout,  with  the  exception  of  the  attitude  of  Senator  Lodge,  and 
most  of  all,  Elihu  Root,  who  at  that  time  was  a senator  from  New 
York.  Throughout  the  debate,  the  latter  vigorously  denounced  exemp- 
tion. 

The  expected  opposition  from  Great  Britain  was  not  long 
forthcoming.  This  was  in  the  form  of  an  informal  protest  on  July  8, 
This  maintained  that  the  exemption  from  tolls  of  all  American  ship- 
ping would  involve  an  infraction  of  the  treaty;  that  a subsidy  made 
by  the  remission  of  tolls  charged  would  not  be  in  accordance  with  the 
obligations  of  the  treaty;  and  that  it  would  be  "impossible  to  frame 
regulations  which  would  prevent  the  exemption  from  resulting  in  a 

preference  to  United  States  shipping  and  consequently  an  infraction 
13 

of  the  treaty",  A few  days  later,  Sir  Edward  Grey  also  let  Mr. 
Whitelaw  Reid,  American  Ambassador,  understand  that  Great  Britain 
regarded  the  terms  of  the  bill  as  an  "invidious  discrimination".14 

With  the  exception  of  the  Anglophobic  element,  the  United 
States  was  fairly  well  divided  in  its  opinion  with  the  greater  part 
against  Congress.  The  noisy  attitude  of  the  Senate  was  enough  to 
cause  even  the  staunchest  of  Republicans  to  waiver  in  support  of  the 


IE 

Cong. 

13 

Record,  part  9.  End  Sess 

. 6£nd  Cong.,  7985. 

8E-83. 

Innes 

14 

to  Knox,  July  8,  191E. 

Sen.  Doc. . no.  474, 

470. 

Reid 

to  Knox,  July  15,  191S. 

Foreign  Relations.  1912. 

-68- 

bill.  There  was  a marked  tendency  to  admit  the  plausibility  of  the 

15 

British  protest  and  to  want  the  question  arbitrated. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  water,  there  was  considerable  dis- 
may, but  a belief  that  the  United  States  would  not  take  such  a stand 
against  the  sanctity  of  treaties.  The  English  also  trusted  that  if 
diplomacy  failed  that  the  matter  could  be  settled  by  arbitration.1*^ 
The  anti-American  element  could  see  nothing  in  the  bill  that  had  not 
been  caused  by  the  policy  of  conciliation  that  the  various  Foreign 
Secretaries  had  always  maintained  towards  United  States.  The 
Saturday  Review  very  ironically  said:  "Foreign  Office  wisdom  may  be 

summed  up  in  the  text:  'Never  contradict  the  United  States'.  It 

must  now  be  close  on  a century  since  we  did.  About  ten  years  ago, 
sooner  than  contradict  the  United  States,  we  abrogated  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  which  set  out  to  express  the  eternal  determination  of 
the  contracting  parties--and  was  in  force  for  just  fifty  years.... 

In  this  matter  Americans  have  every  reason  to  expect  that,  if  they 
persist  in  their  resolve  to  tear  up  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty.  Great 

Britain  will  acquiesce.  This  is  all  we  get  and  all  we  deserve  to  get 

17 

for  our  perpetual  climbing  down". 

18 

The  Senate  passed  the  bill  by  an  overwhelming  vote.  The 
House,  awake  to  the  reaction  caused  by  the  drastic  procedure  of  the 

15 

Editorial  in  The  Chicago  Tribune.  Aug.  10.  1912. 

16 

Editorial  in  The  Times . July  12  and  16,  1912;  "Topics 
of  the  Day"  in  The  Spectator.  July  20,  1912. 

17 

Editorial  in  Saturday  Review.  July  20.  1912. 

18 

Cong.  Record . part  11,  2nd  Sess.  62nd  Cong.,  10590. 


. 

. 


19 

Senate,  limited  the  exemption  to  coastwise  vessels*  Prior  to  the 

passage  by  the  House,  President  Taft,  also  alarmed  by  the  opposition 

and  its  character,  proposed  that  Congress  pass  a joint  resolution 

providing  among  other  things  that  any  alien,  who  felt  that  he  had 

been  deprived  of  rights  that  should  have  been  his  according  to  the 

treaty,  should  have  the  right  to  appeal  to  United  States  courts  for 

redress;  and  that  the  act  of  Congress  should  not  be  deemed  to  repeal 

any  portion  of  the  treaty.  Should  Congress  pass  the  resolution, 

Taft  felt  that  the  good  faith  of  the  United  States  would  be  recogniz- 
20 

ed*  But  Congress  was  not  of  such  an  apologetic  mind  and  refused 

21 

to  pass  the  resolution*  The  bill  became  a law  on  the  24th  of 

August  and  the  President  was  given  the  right  to  allow  coastwise 

22 

vessels  to  go  through  free  of  toll*  ~ In  a memorandum  accompanying 

his  signature,  Taft  argued  that  the  treaty  did  not  deprive  the 

United  States  of  any  right  to  regulate  its  own  commerce;  that  the 

treaty  only  gave  all  nations  most-favored-nation  treatment — the 

corollary  being  that  the  word  "all”  in  the  treaty  did  not  include 

23 

the  United  States*  When  he  asserted  that  there  was  as  yet  no 
necessity  for  a discussion  of  the  matter  since  the  President  had  not 
yet  issued  an  order  exempting  coastwise  vessels,  no  doubt  he  intended 

19 

Cong.  Record,  part  11,  2nd  Sess.  62nd  Cong.,  10590. 

20 

Ibid.,  11324;  Sen.  Doc.,  no.  474,  326. 

21 

Ibid.,  11324  ff. 

22 

Statutes  at  Large,  XXXVII,  part  1,  560-569. 

23 

Sen.  Doc . , no.  474,  340-343. 


r 

! ' 


' 


i 


p • 


' 


-70- 

to  use  it  as  a loophole  to  allow  his  "better  sense  to  control  his 

actions.  Obviously,  he  was  not  fully  satisfied  with  the  bill,  but 

seemed  to  feel  that  it  was  better  than  none. 

As  it  had  been  earlier  in  the  controversy,  the  fair-minded 

press  was  divided;  however,  there  seemed  to  be  very  little  opposi- 

24 

tion  amongst  the  editors  to  arbitration.  But  in  England,  even  the 
best  friends  of  the  United  States  lost  heart.  They  felt  that  the 
act  of  Congress  was  not  only  an  outright  violation  of  the  treaty  but 
also  of  the  spirit  in  which  Lord  Pauncefote  and  Mr.  Hay  had  negotia- 
ted it,  in  the  light  of  the  great  concessions  to  the  United  States. 
Some  called  it  an  act  of  "cynical  perfidy".  Taft  lost  his  reputa- 
tion there  as  a lawyer;  but  due  to  his  past  fondness  for  arbitration 
they  had  not  entirely  given  up  hope  of  a settlement  in  this  case.25 

In  the  campaign,  the  Republicans  were  quiet  on  the  subject 
The  Democrats  declared  for  the  exemption  of  coastwise  ships.  The 

Progressives,  after  making  a vigorous  assertion  of  American  rights 

27 

in  the  canal,  declared  for  the  exemption.  The  main  utterance  of 
any  of  the  candidates  was  that  made  by  Mr.  Wilson,  in  which  he  up- 
held the  exemption,  but  he  made  no  reference  to  the  dangers  to  our 

24 

Editorials  in  The  New  Yo rk  Tribune . Aug.  11,  14,  16, 
and  21,  1912;  "The  March  of  Events"  in  The  World's  Work.  Oct.  1912. 

25 

Editorial  in  The  Times.  Aug.  12,  1912;  editorial  in  the 
Saturday  Revie?/.  Aug.  31,  1912;  "Topics  of  the  Day  in  The  Spectator. 
Aug.  31,  19l2. 

26 

Stanwood,  History  of  the  Presidency.  269. 

27 

Ibid. . 295-296. 


-71- 

foreign  relations.28 

The  attitude  of  the  Foreign  Office  was  expressed  in  a 
letter  that  was  handed  to  Secretary  of  State  Knox  on  December  9, 

1912.  It  was  a plain  and  straightforward  statement,  though  very 
kindly  and  courteous.  It  stated  that  there  was  no  intention  on  the 
part  of  Great  Britain  to  deny  to  the  United  States  the  right  to  sub- 
sidize its  own  shipping,  but  a subsidy  that  produced  results  which 
were  prejudicial  to  British  interests  as  given  her  by  the  treaty  was 
another  matter,  for  British  shipping  interests  were  very  large  and 
equal  treatment  was  given  by  the  United  States  in  return  for  the 
rights  surrendered  by  Great  Britain.  Had  not  Great  Britain  super- 
seded the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  in  order  to  retain  Article  VIII  which 
gave  just  and  equitable  charges?  Did  not  this  retention  limit  the 
liberty  of  action  of  the  United  States?  Had  not  the  United  States 
recovered  the  right  to  construct  the  canal  solely  at  the  stipulation 
of  equal  treatment?  Such  was  the  main  argument  of  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
Besides,  discrimination  to  him  was  unjust  and  placed  the  burden  of 
the  expense  upon  the  foreign  shipping.  Furthermore,  although  Great 
Britain  was  reluctant  to  make  a protest,  she  was  certain  that  it 

was  valid;  but  in  view  of  the  conflict  of  American  opinion,  she  was 

29 

willing  to  submit  the  case  to  arbitration. 

28 

Cong;.  Record . 2nd  Sess.,  63rd  Cong.,  App.  221.  This  was 
the  celebrated  speech  made  by  Mr.  Wilson,  the  Democratic  candidate, 
on  Aug.  15,  1912  when  he  made  the  following  statement  after  an 
appeal  to  the  crowd  for  exemption.  "Our  platform  is  not  molasses 
to  catch  flies.  It  means  what  it  says”. 

29 

Grey  to  Bryce,  Nov.  14,  1912.  Sen.  Doc.,  no.  474, 

85-93. 


-72- 


In  the  meantime,  the  President  had  issued  his  proclamation 
relative  to  tolls,  hut  he  had  refrained  from  exempting  coastwise 
trade,  an  omission  which  lends  color  to  the  conclusion  that  he  had 
felt  the  force  of  the  British  contention  as  well  as  the  character 
of  the  opposition  in  the  United  States.  The  reply  of  Secretary  Knox 
was  controlled  to  a certain  extent  hy  this  omission.  The  answer  was 
a strictly  legal  argument  with  no  element  of  diplomatic  courtesy  nor 
the  usual  felicitations.  In  the  first  place,  Knox  held  that  since 
the  President  had  done  nothing  as  yet,  the  British  claim  was  Based 
wholly  on  conjecture  and  not  on  facts.  Moreover,  the  exemption  of 
United  States  vessels  from  tolls  was  not  a question  for  arbitration 
for  the  reason  that  at  the  time  of  the  negotiation  of  the  Hay-Herran 
Treaty  which  provided  that  Colombian  vessels  should  be  allowed  to  go 
through  the  canal  free  from  tolls  Great  Britain  had  made  no  protest. 
A most  important  point  was  made  when  Knox  asserted  that  in  the  figur- 
ing of  rates,  coastwise  vessels  had  been  included;  consequently,  in 

case  of  the  exemption,  the  United  States  bore  all  the  loss  and  thus 

30 

aided  and  subsidized  foreign  shipping.  In  other  words,  using  the 
vernacular,  the  Secretary  said,  "Why  should  you  kick?”. 

To  this  refusal  to  arbitrate.  Viscount  Bryce  made  no  pre- 
tense to  answer  every  argument.  He  maintained,  however,  that  by  all 
the  principles  of  international  law,  any  nation  could  protest  when 
its  rights  were  about  to  be  infringed  upon;  that  the  omission  in  the 
proclamation  had  not  changed  the  issue  because  Congress  had  declared 

30 

Knox  to  Laughlin,  Jan.  17,  1913.  Sen.  Doc.,  no.  474, 


93-100 


. 


. 


. 


..  I . . . 


1.  V.. 


- 


. 


. 

• 

-73- 

its  power  to  discriminate.  He  also  used  the  argument,  advocated  in 
so  many  papers,  that  this  was  a proper  question  to  test  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  arbitration  treaty  of  1908.  Although  there  was  a ten- 
dency to  quibble  over  small  matters  as  seemed  to  have  been  the  case 
in  the  preceding  notes,  above  all  Bryce’s  reply  was  courteous.^1  He 
wanted  a settlement  for  the  best  interests  of  both  nations,  and 
showed  no  such  tendency  to  evade  arbitration  as  was  only  too  evident 
in  the  lawyer’s  argument  of  Knox. 

After  the  campaign  was  over  in  November,  some  of  the  lead- 
ing men  of  the  United  States  began  to  take  a more  rational  view. 

During  the  winter  of  1912-1913  there  was  a considerable  expression 

32 

of  opinion  on  the  subject.  Ex-Secretary  of  State  Olney  supported 
the  State  Department.  Roosevelt,  who  perhaps  had  had  a hand  in  the 
writing  of  the  platform  of  the  Progressives,  very  early  opposed  ex- 
emption as  being  a violation  of  the  treaty.  He  proposed  that  the 

American  government  should  first  get  the  consent  of  the  other  nations 

33 

before  taking  such  action  as  had  been  advocated  by  Congress.1"  Mr. 
Joseph  H.  Choate  also  vigorously  opposed  it  as  an  outright  violation 
of  the  treaty.34  In  the  Senate,  exemption  was  not  allowed  to  rest 
in  peace.  Elihu  Root  had  already  introduced  a bill  to  repeal  the 
exemption  part  of  the  Panama  Canal  Act.33 

31 

101-102. 


34 

xii.  oiie  uciicfcuc,  oAcinyi/jLuu 

Root  had  already  introduce 

In  a powerful  speech  on 
Bryce  to  Knox,  Feb.  27,  1912.  Sen.  Doc.,  no.  474, 


32 

Cong.  Record . part  1,  3rd  Sess.,  62nd  Cong.,  1981-1991. 
The  "Coastwise  Exemption”--protests  of  the  nation  against  exemption. 

33 

George  L.  Burr  to  Repr.  Underhill,  Mar.  2,  1914. 

Cong.  Record . 2nd  Sess.,  63rd  Cong.,  App.,  17. 

35 

Ibid.,  165-166. 

35 

Cong.  Record . part  2,  3rd  Sess.,  62nd  Cong.,  1482. 


-74- 

the  floor  of  the  Senate,  he  urged  it  to  retrieve  the  country's  honor 
and  reputation,  and  he  attacked  the  disposition  to  refuse  arbitration 
in  these  words:  "Oh  Mr.  President,  are  we  Pharisees?  Have  we  been 

insincere  and  false?  Have  we  been  pretending  in  all  these  long  years 
of  resolution  and  declaration  and  proposal  and  urgency  for  arbitra- 
tion? Are  we  ready  now  to  admit  that  our  country,  that  its  Congresse 
have  all  been  guilty  of  false  pretence,  of  humbug,  of  talking  to  the 
gallery,  of  fine  words  to  secure  applause,  and  that  the  instant  we 
have  an  interest  we  are  ready  to  falsify  every  declaration,  every 

promise,  and  every  principle?  We  must  arbitrate  the  interpretation 

36 

of  this  treaty  or  we  must  retire  from  the  position  we  have  taken." 

The  administration  that  came  into  power  in  March  was  sus- 
pected of  having  views  on  the  question  that  did  not  bode  well  to  the 
British,  for  had  not  the  Democratic  party  declared  for  the  absolute 
American  control  of  the  canal?  It  was  not  long,  however,  until  the 

President  began  to  change  his  mind  about  the  tolls-exemption  ques- 

37 

tion.  About  four  months  after  the  inauguration,  the  British  govern' 
ment  was  made  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  United  States  would  get  rid 

7Q 

of  this  bone  of  contention  when  the  opportune  moment  arrived. 

With  this  understanding,  Earl  Grey  made  no  further  protest  against 
the  disputed  provision  of  the  Panama  Canal  Act.  Walter  Hines  Page, 
the  Ambassador  to  the  Court  of  St.  James,  was  fully  convinced  that 

36 

Cong.  Record,  part  2.  3rd  Sess..  62nd  Cong.,  1482. 

37 

Ante.  p.  71. 

38 

Hendrick,  The  Life  and  Letters  of  Walter  Hines  Page . 
World's  Work.  Sept.  1921. 


-75- 

the  United  States  was  in  the  wrong.  He  met  everywhere  in  England 

40 

the  feeling  of  distrust  of  the  United  States.  Nor  did  he  hesitate 

to  let  the  President  know  of  the  situation,  and  in  his  letters  to 

Wilson  may  be  found  the  contributing  ideas  that  caused  the  President 

to  take  the  stand  that  he  did;  for  example,  "And  everywhere  in 

circles  the  most  friendly  to  us,  and  the  best  informed--I  receive 

commiseration  because  of  the  dishonorable  attitude  of  our  Government 

about  the  Panama  Canal  Tolls.  This,  I confess,  is  hard  to  meet.  We 

made  a bargain--a  solemn  compact — and  we  have  broken  it.  Whether  it 

were  a good  bargain  or  a bad  one,  a silly  one  or  a wise  one;  that's 

far  from  the  point.  And  this  Canal  Tolls  matter  stands  in  the  way 

of  everything.  It  is  in  their  minds  all  the  time — the  minds  of  all 

parties  and  all  sections  of  opinion.  They  hold  our  Government  in 

shame  as  long  as  this  thing  stands....  We  can  command  these  people, 

this  Government,  this  tight  island,  and  its  world-wide  empire;  they 

honor  us,  they  envy  us,  they  fear  us;  they  see  the  time  near  at 

hand  when  we  shall  command  the  capital  and  commerce  of  the  world  if 

we  unfetter  our  mighty  people;  they  wish  to  keep  very  close  to  us. 

But  they  are  suspicious  of  our  Government;  they  contend  that  it  has 

41 

violated  its  faith.  Is  it  so  or  is  it  not?"  Page  also  felt  that 
since  Great  Britain  had  yielded  to  let  the  United  States  deal  with 
Mexico,  the  United  States  should  give  something  in  return. 

39 

Hendrick,  The  Life  and  Letters  of  Walter  Hines  Page , 
World's  Work.  Sept.  1921. 

40 

Page  to  Wilson,  Sept.  13,  1913.  Ibid. 

41 

Page  to  Wilson,  Jan.  6,  1914.  Ibid. 


-76- 


President  Wilson  began  to  put  out  feelers  in  the  Senate  and 

the  Foreign  Relations  Committee.  He  was  fully  determined  to  repeal 

42 

the  exemption  clause.  In  a statement  to  his  private  secretary, 
Joseph  Tumulty,  he  said,  MI  am  the  trustee  of  the  people  and  I am 
bound  to  take  cognizance  of  the  fact  that  by  reason  of  our  attitude 
on  Panama  Canal  Tolls  our  treaties  are  discredited  in  every  chancel- 
lery in  Europe,  where  we  are  looked  upon  as  a nation  that  does  not 
live  up  to  its  plighted  word... We  cannot  expect  to  hold  the  friend- 
ship of  the  world,  especially  of  England,  Prance,  and  Japan,  if  we 
are  to  treat  agreements  not  as  inviolable  contracts,  but  as  matters 
of  convenience,  whose  plain  terms  are  to  be  ignored  when  matters  of 
expediency  dictate ... .Some  unforeseen  contingency  may  arise  where  it 
will  be  found  that  the  reason  for  their  withdrawal  of  friendship  for 
us  was  our  petty  attitude  in  this  affair... It  is  important  that  every 

agreement  that  America  subscribes  her  name  to  shall  be  carried  out 

43 

in  the  spirit  of  those  w ho  negotiated  it”. 

In  this  frame  of  mind  he  appeared  on  March  5,  1914,  before 
Congress  and  asked  it  to  repeal  the  exemption  provision  of  the  Panama 
Canal  Act,  emphasizing  all  the  while  the  maintenance  of  our  good  re- 
lations with  the  world.  He  closed  his  short  address  with  this  appeal: 
"I  ask  this  of  you  in  support  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  adminis- 
tration. I shall  not  know  how  to  deal  with  other  matters  of  even 

42 

House  to  Page,  Jan.  14,  1914.  Hendrick,  The  Life  and 
Letters  of  Walter  Hines  Page.  World's  Work.  Sept.  1921. 

43 

Tumulty,  Woodrow  Wilson  as  _I  Know  Him.  165-166. 


-77- 


great  er  delicacy  and  nearer  consequence  if  you  do  not  grant  it  to 

44 

me  in  ungrudging  measure.” 

It  is  doubtful  if  at  any  time  in  his  career  Wilson  ever 

received  the  noble  support  of  the  leading  men  of  the  nation  as  he 

did  after  this  message--especially  the  Republicans.  They  commended 

him  for  his  high  purpose  in  view  of  the  reversal  of  his  former 

45 

stand  on  the  question.  The  point  that  he  had  made  in  regards  to 
the  condition  of  our  national  honor  had  "gone  home,"  so  to  speak. 
There  was  much  opposition,  however,  even  aside  from  the  Hearst  pa- 
pers. Other  newspaoers  questioned  what  they  regarded  as  wounding 

46 

American  pride,  unless  he  explained  his  allusion  to  foreign  problems. 

The  British  were  naturally  elated  at  the  turn  of  affairs, 

but  were  dubious  as  to  whether  Wilson  would  realize  his  wish,  due  to 

the  fact  that  anti -British  sentiment  had  been  inflamed  because  of 

the  Ulster  situation.  Moreover,  they  recognized  a strong  tendency 

in  the  United  States  that  it  should  do  as  it  pleased,  regardless  of 

47 

what  the  consequences  might  be.  The  bill  to  repeal  the  exemption 
clause  soon  got  under  way  in  the  House,  where  it  met  heavy  opposi- 
tion from  leading  democrats,  largely  because  of  its  open  violation 


44 

Gong.  Record,  Dart  5,  2nd  Sess.,  63rd  Gong. , 4313. 

45 

Editorial  in  The  Hew  York  Tribune,  Mar.  7,  1914. 

46 

Editorial  in  the  Washington  Post,  Mar.  26,  1914.  Gong. 
Record,  part  6,  2nd  Sess.  63rd  Gong.,  6106. 

47 

"Topics  of  the  Day"  in  The  Spectator,  Apr.  4,  1914; 
editorial  in  The  Times,  Mar.  23,  1914. 


49 


of  the  Democratic  platform.  The  leader  of  this  group  was  Ohamp 
48 

Clark.  But  the  hill  passed,  nevertheless,  on  the  31st  of  March. 

The  debate  over  the  bill  in  the  Senate  was  not  of  the 

blustery  type  that  was  sweeping  the  country  at  the  time.  Instead 

of  stooping  to  insolence  and  rancor  towards  Great  Britain,  the 

50 

Senators  weighed  the  question  carefully.  An  interesting  feature 

here  was  the  introduction  into  the  Senate,  as  had  already  been  the 

case  in  the  lower  House,  of  letters  from  the  ex-Senators  who  had 

been  in  the  Senate  at  the  time  of  the  failure  of  the  First-Hay- 

Pauncefote  Treaty.  These  gentlemen  disagreed  as  to  the  reason  the 

Senate  at  that  time  refused  to  pass  the  Bard  amendment  excluding  the 

coastwise  trade  from  the  operation  of  the  treaty.  Some,  like  ex- 

Senator  Beveridge  of  Indiana,  maintained  that  the  reason  that  it  had 

failed  was  because  the  Senate  thought  that  it  was  an  unnecessary 

51 

addition  since  the  right  to  exempt  was  included  in  the  treaty. 

On  the  other  hand,  ex-Senator  and  ex -Vice  President  Fairbanks  ex- 
plained the  failure  of  the  Senate  to  include  the  Bard  amendment  by 

showing  that  the  Senate  regarded  such  a provision  for  exemption  as 

52 

a violation  of  the  spirit  of  equality.  Another  feature  was  the 


48 

Cong.  .Record,  part  6,  2nd  Sess.  63rd  Cong.  Speech  of 
Clark  on  Mar.  31. 

49 

Ibid.,  6089. 

50 

Ibid.,  part  7,  8942-8956. 

51 

Ibid.,  5923,  6334, 

52 

North  Amer i can  Review,  May  1914. 


-79- 

reading  into  the  Congress ional  Record  of  the  letters  and  statements 
of  Mr.  Choate  and  Mr.  White,  both  of  whom  maintained  that  such  a 
thing  as  any  exemption  was  unheard  of  in  any  part  of  the  negotia- 
tions. Mr.  Choate  was  especially  vehement  in  his  denunciation  of 

53 

exemption  as  being  an  outright  violation  of  the  treaty.  One  of 

the  most  important  statements  brought  to  light  was  one  that  had  been 

made  by  Hay  about  the  time  of  the  treaty  with  Panama.  He  had  said: 

’’All  means  all.  The  treaty  was  not  so  long  that  we  could  not  have 

made  room  for  the  word  ’other1  if  we  understood  that  it  belonged 

there.  ’All  nations1  means  all  nations,  and  the  United  States  is 

certainly  a nation.  It  was  the  understanding  of  both  Governments, 

and  I have  no  doubt  that  the  Senate  realized  in  ratifying  the  second 

treaty  without  such  an  amendment  it  was  committing  us  to  the 

principle  of  giving  all  friendly  nations  equal  privileges  in  the 

54 

canal  with  ourselves.  That  is  our  golden  rule”. 

Senators  McCumber,  Kenyon,  Burton,  Lodge,  and  Root,  we re 
the  leaders  for  the  repeal.  Lodge  maintained  that  the  United  States 
had  the  legal  right  to  exempt  coastwise  trade;  but  in  view  of  the 
difference  of  opinion  of  such  leading  men  as  Olney  and  Root,  he  was 
in  favor  of  repeal.  He  did  not  think  it  wise  to  take  a firm  stand 
upon  a doubtful  question,  neither  to  flout  the  rigits  of  other 

53 

White  to  McCumber,  Mar.  31,  1914.  Cong.  Record,  part 
7,  2nd  Sess.,  63rd  Cong.,  6286;  Choate  to  McCumber , April  6,  1914. 
Ibid. , 6267. 

54 

Root ’ s Addresses,  257. 


. 


. 


nations  nor  to  oppose  the  "understanding”  of  Hay,  Choate,  and  White. 
In  one  of  the  greatest  speeches  of  his  career.  Root  manfully  ar- 
gued for  the  United  States  to  maintain  its  prestige  abroad.  He 
pointed  out  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  mankind;  that  America 
had  always  stood  for  equality  of  treatment  from  the  time  of  Clay 
and  Adams;  that  at  this  time  the  conscience  of  America  was  at 
stake.  He,  too,  maintained  that  the  United  States  had  the  right  to 
subsidize  its  own  shipping,  but  that  the  broad  view  of  the  treaty 
excluded  it  from  granting  a subsidy  in  favor  of  American  shipping 
in  the  canal;  furthermore,  the  "understanding"  of  Hay  and  Choate 

must  be  taken  into  consideration  in  the  interpretation  of  the 
56 

treaty. 

Senator  O’ Gorman,  chairman  of  the  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  and  hitherto  a leading  advocate  of  Wilson's  policies,  now 
took  the  floor  against  his  leader.  In  a forceful  and  convincing 
speech,  he  denied  that  the  United  States  was  included  in  the  term 
"all  nations",  he  opposed  the  violation  of  the  party  platform,  and 
he  accused  the  administration  of  truckling  to  Great  Britain.  The 
duty  of  the  Senate,  he  believed,  v/as  to  the  American  people  first 
of  all,  no  matter  about  foreign  relations.  He  opposed  the  repeal 
upon  economic  grounds,  arguing  that  the  exemption  would  favor 
cheaper  freight  rates.  He  ridiculed  the  "understanding"  of  the 

55 

Cong.  Record,  part  7,  2nd  Sess.,  63rd  Cong.,  64  5 2 , 64  55. 

56 

Ibid. , 8955-8956. 


. . , 


« 


■'  i : ’ < ‘ 


-81- 


negotiators.  In  an  outburst  of  sarcasm,  he  questioned:  T’What  is 
our  status?  Do  we  own  the  canal,  or  are  we  only  an  international 
caretaker,  with  no  special  privilege  except  to  foot  the  bills  and  to 
maintain  a sufficient  military  force  to  defend  the  canal  and  pre- 
serve its  neutrality?  Is  our  only  reward  the  glory  of  the  achi eve- 
57 

ment?" 

The  passage  of  the  repeal  bill  on  June  11,  even  though  an 

amendment  was  made  that  the  action  of  the  Senate  was  not  a disavowal 

58 

of  United  States'  rights,  was  a great  relief  to  the  President,  and 

he  took  a personal  pride  in  the  outcome,  for  he  felt  it  to  be  a 

59 

landmark  of  his  administration.  And  it  seemed  to  be  regarded  so 

at  the  time  by  the  press  of  both  countries.  Even  papers  in  England 

that  had  a chronic  anti-American  habit  felt  that  after  all  there 

was  an  element  of  Puritanism  in  Americans  that  made  them  want  to  do 

60 

the  right  thing.  Sir  Edward  Urey,  in  an  address  before  Parliament, 
referred  to  Wilson's  achievement  and  uttered  a prophetic  statement: 
"I  believe  it  (his  special  motive)  has  been  much  the  greater  motive 
and  feeling  that  any  Government — any  one  of  the  great  civilized 
Governments  which  is  going  to  use  its  influence  to  make  the  rela- 
tions not  between  tvro  countries,  but  between  all  the  great  civilized 
and  peaceful  nations  of  the  world,  if  the  opportunity  arises — must 


57 

Cong.  Record,  part  7,  2nd  Sess.,  63rd  Cong.,  8212-8220. 

58 

Statutes  at  Large,  XXXVIII,  part  1,  385-386. 

59 

Tumulty,  Woodrow  Wilson,  162. 

60 

Editorial  in  Saturday  Review.  June  27,  1914. 


■ 


-82- 

never  flinch  or  quail  from  interpreting  treaty  rights.  If  that  he 

so,  the  settlement  of  this  question  has  an  influence,  and  a much 

greater  influence  than  the  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
61 

Great  Britain." 

Not  long  after  this  temporary  settlement  of  the  dispute, 

the  World  War  hurst  upon  Europe.  Strangely  enough,  the  United 

States  and  Great  Britain  came  to  the  verge  of  war  with  each  other, 

due  to  a difference  of  opinion  regarding  the  rights  of  neutrals  on 

the  seas,  aided  hy  what  the  United  States  considered  violations  of 

those  rights.  It  was  due  to  the  heroic  efforts  of  Ambassador  Page 

62 

in  handling  the  matter  in  London  that  war  was  averted.  The 
United  States  eventually  entered  the  war  on  the  same  side  with  Great 
Britain,  and  the  relations  between  the  two  countries  probably  were 
best  during  the  summer  of  1918. 

But  the  passage  of  the  Repealing  Act  in  1914  may  not  be 
as  permanent  as  was  hoped  by  its  sponsors.  When  the  Republican 
Party  met  in  June,  1920,  it  was  a thoroughly  nationalistic  body, 
partly  the  results  of  efforts  to  remain  party  harmony  between  the 
"irreconcilables"  and  the  rest  of  the  party.  The  Committee  on 
Resolutions  adopted  without  a dissenting  vote  a "plank"  presented 
by  Senator  Borah:  "We  recommend  that  all  ships  engaged  in  coastwise 
trade  and  all  vessels  of  the  American  merchant  marine  shall  pass 

61 

Parliamentary  Debates,  5t,h  series,  1914,  LXIV,  107. 

62 

Hendrick,  Wal t er  Hines  Page , November  and  December  (1921) 
numbers  of  The  Worlds  Work. 


-63- 

63 

through  the  Panama  Canal  without  payment  of  tolls". 

This  was  more  or  less  lost  sight  of  during  the  campaign, 
hut  Senator  Borah  had  not  entirely  forgotten  it.  Hence,  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1921  he  introduced  in  the  Senate  a bill  in  accordance  with 
his  plank  in  the  platform.  Only  one  thing  stood  in  the  way  and  that 
was  the  coming  international  conference  that  had  been  called  by 
President  Harding  to  discuss  the  problem  of  the  limitation  of  arma- 
ments. Many  Senators  felt  that  the  time  was  most  inopportune  for  a 
discussion  and  passage  of  a bill  that  was  plainly  out  of  sympathy 

C A 

with  the  British  interpretation  of  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty.  In 
fact,  the  Senate  was  asked  by  the  President  to  put  the  bill  away 
until  after  the  conference. 

The  majority,  however,  was  indisposed  to  brook  any  delay 
or  even  interference , and  the  debate  continued.  As  was  to  be  expect- 
ed, no  new  evidence  was  brought  to  bear  upon  the  question,  the  argu- 
ments used  being  oractically  the  same  as  found  in  the  debates  over 

65 

the  Panama  Canal  bill  and  the  repeal  two  years  later.  Many  Senators 
used  a very  popular  line  of  argument  when  they  related  the  great 
expenses  of  the  canal  to  the  United  States;  the  $40,000,000  to  the 
French  Canal  Company,  $10,000,000  to  Panama  and  an  annuity  of 
$250,000,  and  were  about  to  pay  Colombia  the  sum  of  $25,000,000  as 
"heartbalm" , and  the  estimated  cost  of  the  building  of  it — about 

63 

Cong.  Record.  1st  Sess.,  67th  Cong.,  6910.  Statement  by 
Senator  Watson  from  Indiana,  who  was  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Resolutions. 

64 

Ibid.,  6896. 

65 

Ibid. . 6900. 


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• 

. 


• « 


. 


. 


-84- 

,000,000.  These  figures  were  played  upon  for  arguing  that  the 

United  States  ought  to  he  allowed  to  do  as  it  pleased.  Another  was 

that  since  Great  Britain  had  conceded  the  United  States  special 

rights  in  all  the  other  sections  of  Article  III,  why  should  she  have 

any  right  to  hold  the  United  States  to  the  strict  wording  of  the 

first  section?  One  praiseworthy  feature  of  the  debate  was  a growing 

66 

willingness  to  submit  the  question  to  arbitration* 

Yet  another  element  entered  into  the  debate  that  should 
not  be  lost  sight  of,  and  that  was  the  Senatorial  pride — or  should  it 
be  called  arrogance?  Por  instance.  Senator  Borah  said:  "We  are  put- 

ting a construction  upon  the  treaty  by  act  of  Congress. . .so  that  when 
we  pass  this  law,  we  shall  then  have  arrived  at  the  point .. .where 
arbitration  can  properly  be  asked  for  by  Great  Britain — and  there 
will  be  something  to  arbitrate.  We  do  not  by  this  act  refuse  to 
arbitrate.  When  she  asks  for  arbitration,  then  we  can  cross  the 
bridge" . 6 7 

The  bill  passed  on  October  10,  1921,  by  the  rather  close 
vote  of  47-37,  with  12  not  voting.  So  far,  at  the  present  writing, 
the  House  has  not  taken  up  the  bill  as  passed  by  the  Senate.  But  the 
signs  point  in  the  direction  of  a passage  of  the  bill  by  the  Senate 
and  the  signature  of  the  President — unless  he  switches  from  his 
platform  as  did  his  predecessor. 

66 

Cong.  Record,  1st  Sess.,  67th  Cong.,  6910.  Debates  of 
Oct.  10,  1921.  Note  Senator  Lodge's  speech.  Ibid.  6894-6895. 

Note  that  his  stand  was  entirely  consistent  with  his  stand  in  1912, 

1914#  67 

Ibid.,  6911-6912. 

68 

Ibid. . 6916. 


-85- 


CONCLUSION 

Today,  when  one  reads  statements  which  assert  that  all 
existing  controversies  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
have  been  settled  and  that  relations  between  them  are  the  best  that 
they  have  been  since  1783,  he  is  gratified  and  at  the  same  time 
hopeful  that  these  good  relations  will  continue.  There  is  room, 
however,  for  one  to  be  somewhat  pessimistic  of  any  perpetuation  of 
these  good  relations  as  long  as  there  is  the  canal  question. 

After  the  Spanish-Amer ican  War,  it  was  thought  that  rela- 
tions were  closer  than  they  had  ever  been.  But  what  happened? 

The  Senate  soon  proceeded  to  threaten  to  get  rid  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty.  It  even  worked  itself  up  to  such  a temper  that  it 
made  demands  upon  Great  Britain  by  means  of  the  amendments  to  the 
first  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  that  she  could  not  honorably  accept. 

It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  that  mood  put  such  fear  into  the 
hearts  of  the  men  who  negotiated  the  Hay-Pauncefote  Treaty  that  a 
more  nearly  "American  canal"  was  made  possible. 

Again,  in  1912,  relations  were  thought  to  be  the  closest. 
All  controversies  had  been  settled.  But  all  of  a sudden,  Congress 
passed  the  Panama  Canal  Act  which  was  soon  approved  by  President 
Taft.  Due  to  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  regarded  the  exemption 
clause  as  a violation  of  the  treaty,  she  made  an  entirely  natural 
and  logical  protest.  She  gained  little  by  this,  and  relations 
gradually  became  worse  than  they  had  been  since  1900.  With  the 
aid  of  Elihu  Hoot  and  others,  President  Wilson  prevailed  upon  Con- 
gress to  repeal  the  objectionable  portion  of  the  act.  Thus,  confi- 


. 


-66- 

dence  was  restored. 

It  is  the  observation  of  these  facts  that  makes  the 
people  of  the  United  States  realize  that  the  question  is  by  no  means 
settled.  In  the  past,  whenever  the  United  States  has  changed  her 
policy  in  regard  to  a canal  with  little  thought  of  treaty  obliga- 
tions, Great  Britain,  ever  on  the  alert  to  prevent  any  violation 
of  the  treaty  when  it  affected  British  interests,  has  protested.  A 
repetition  of  any  action  by  the  United  States  derogatory  to  the 
spirit  and  letter  of  the  treaty  will  most  assuredly  bring  about  a 
protest  from  England. 

The  situation  is  pregnant  of  possibilities.  The  United 
States  has  now  come  to  be  regarded  as  the  probable  leader  of  the 
world.  Will  she  accept  this  role  and  set  an  example  by  keeping  the 
letter  and  spirit  of  the  Hay-Pauncef ote  Treaty?  Or  will  she  become 
so  overjoyed  at  her  present  fort-unate  "splendid  isolation"  that  she 
will  disregard  the  spirit  and  letter  of  that  treaty  and  deal  with 
the  canal  as  a purely  "American  Canal"?  Our  "canal  policy"  may  yet 
be  the  indicator  of  the  future  history  of  the  United  States. 


-87- 

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